

# Immanuel Kant

# Critique of Judgment

## Kant Critique of Judgment

HACKETT

translated by  
Werner S. Pluhar

...ionably the best translation in English  
...e best overall edition in non-German."

MAS WILLETTE, *University of Michigan*

...aintains a fine, even tone throughout;  
...ieve as much simplicity as the German original  
...ese who have found the prospect of teaching the  
...aunting will admire its clarity; those who have  
...xt for years will find Pluhar's emendations of  
...ons interesting and provocative. No one, in the  
...t of this reviewer, will be disappointed."

DEAN QUINN in *The Review of Metaphysics*

...tion to great merit in its translation,  
...ies of value to students of Kant are supplied by  
...e. It includes the important and rarely available  
...in an equally fine translation. Both bibliography  
...extensive and useful. . . . Everywhere, cross-  
...ailable at a glance. Mercifully, pagination to the  
...ademie Edition is provided in margins of all  
...ewise in all notes, commentary and references  
...to other texts. . . .


...zardous art—a strategy of compromises, rather  
...age of perfection. This one, to my thinking,  
...persedes all predecessors. . . ."

...STEDER in *International Studies in Philosophy*

HACKETT PUBLISHING COMPANY

P.O. Box 44937

Indianapolis, Indiana 46244-0937



DIVISION I  
ANALYTIC OF  
AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

BOOK I

ANALYTIC OF  
THE BEAUTIFUL

First Moment  
of a Judgment of Taste,<sup>1</sup>  
As to Its Quality

<sup>1</sup>The definition of taste on which I am basing this [analysis] is that it is the ability to judge the beautiful. But we have to analyze judgments of taste in order to discover what is required for calling an object beautiful. I have used the logical functions of judging<sup>2</sup> to help me find the moments that judgment<sup>3</sup> takes into consideration when it reflects (since even a judgment of taste still has reference to the understanding). I have examined the moment of quality first, because an aesthetic judgment about the beautiful is concerned with it first.

<sup>2</sup>[They fall under four headings: quantity, quality, relation, modality. See the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 70 = B 95.]

<sup>3</sup>[*Urteilstkraft*, in this case. Cf. above, Ak. 167 br. n. 4.]

## A Judgment of Taste Is Aesthetic

If we wish to decide whether something is beautiful or not, we do not use understanding to refer the presentation<sup>4</sup> to the object so as to give rise to cognition;<sup>5</sup> rather, we use imagination (perhaps in connection with understanding) to refer the presentation to the subject and his feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Hence a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment and so is not a logical judgment but an aesthetic one, by which we mean a judgment whose determining basis cannot be other than subjective. But any reference of presentations, even of sensations, can be objective (in which case it signifies what is real [rather than formal] in an empirical presentation); excepted is a reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure — this reference designates nothing whatsoever in the object, but here the subject feels himself [namely] how he is affected by the presentation.

To apprehend a regular, purposive building with one's cognitive power<sup>6</sup> (whether the presentation is distinct or confused) is very different from being conscious of this presentation with a sensation of liking. Here the presentation is referred only to the subject, namely, to his feeling of (life,) under the name feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and this forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and judging.<sup>7</sup> This power does not contribute anything to cognition, but merely compares the given presentation in the subject with the entire presentational power, of which the mind becomes conscious when it feels its own state. The presentations given in a judgment may be

<sup>4</sup>[*Vorstellung*, traditionally rendered as 'representation.' (See above, Ak. 175 br. n. 17.) 'Presentation' is a generic term referring to such objects of our direct awareness as sensations, intuitions, perceptions, concepts, cognitions, ideas, and schemata. Cf. the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 320 = B 376-77 and A 140 = B 179.]

<sup>5</sup>[*Erkenntnis*. Cf. above, Ak. 167 br. n. 2.]

<sup>6</sup>[For my use of 'power,' rather than 'faculty,' see above, Ak. 167 br. n. 3.]

<sup>7</sup>[*Beurteilung*.] On Kant's attempt to make a terminological distinction between 'beurteilen' and 'urteilen,' see above, Ak. 169 br. n. 9.]

empirical (and hence aesthetic<sup>8</sup>), but if we refer them to the object, the judgment we make by means of them is logical. On the other hand even if the given presentations were rational, they would still be aesthetic if, and to the extent that, the subject referred them, in his judgment, solely to himself (to his feeling.)

## § 2

### The Liking That Determines a Judgment of Taste Is Devoid of All Interest

Interest is what we call the liking we connect with the presentation of an object's existence. Hence such a liking always refers at once to our power of desire, either as the basis that determines it, or at any rate as necessarily connected with that determining basis. But if the question is whether something is beautiful, what we want to know is not whether we or anyone cares, or so much as might care, in any way, about the thing's existence, but rather how we judge it in our mere contemplation of it (intuition or reflection). Suppose someone asks me whether I consider the palace I see before me beautiful. I might reply that I am not fond of things of that sort, made merely to be gaped at. Or I might reply like that Iroquois *sachem* who said that he liked nothing better in Paris than the eating-houses.<sup>9</sup> I might even

<sup>8</sup>[From Greek *αισθητικός* (aisthēsthai), 'to sense.']

<sup>9</sup>[Wilhelm Windelband, editor of the *Akademie* edition of the *Critique of Judgment*, notes (Ak. V, 527) that Kant's reference has been traced to (Pierre François Xavier de) Charlevoix (1682-1761, French Jesuit traveler and historian), *Histoire et description générale de la Nouvelle-France* (*History and General Description of New France* [in eastern Canada]) (Paris, 1744). Windelband quotes a passage (from III, 322) in French, which translates: "Some Iroquois went to Paris in 1666 and were shown all the royal mansions and all the beauties of that great city. But they did not admire anything in these, and would have preferred the villages to the capital of the most flourishing kingdom of Europe if they had not seen the *rue de la Huchette* where they were delighted with the roisseries that they always found furnished with meats of all sorts." (All translations given in footnotes are my own, and this fact is not indicated in each such footnote individually.)]

go on, as *Rousseau* would, to rebuke the vanity of the great who spend the people's sweat on such superfluous things. I might, finally, quite easily convince myself that, if I were on some uninhabited island with no hope of ever again coming among people, and could conjure up such a splendid edifice by a mere wish, I would not even take that much trouble for it if I already had a sufficiently comfortable hut. The questioner may grant all this and approve of it; but it is not to the point. All he wants to know is whether my mere presentation of the object is accompanied by a liking, no matter how indifferent I may be about the existence of the object of this presentation. We can easily see that, in order for me to say that an object is beautiful, and to prove that I have taste, what matters is what I do with this presentation within myself, and not the [respect] in which I depend on the object's existence. Everyone has to admit that if a judgment about beauty is mingled with the least interest then it is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste. In order to play the judge in matters of taste, we must not be in the least biased in favor of the thing's existence but must be wholly indifferent about it.

There is no better way to elucidate this proposition, which is of prime importance, than by contrasting the pure disinterested<sup>10</sup> liking that occurs in a judgment of taste with a liking connected with interest, especially if we can also be certain that the kinds of interest I am about to mention are the only ones there are.

<sup>10</sup>A judgment we make about an object of our liking may be wholly *disinterested* but still very *interesting*, i.e., it is not based on any interest but it gives rise to an interest; all pure moral judgments are of this sort. But judgments of taste, of themselves, do not even give rise to any interest. Only in society does it become *interesting* to have taste; the reason for this will be indicated later.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup>[See esp. Ak. 275-76 and 296-98.]

## A Liking for the Agreeable Is Connected with Interest

AGREEABLE is what the senses like in sensation. Here the opportunity arises at once to censure and call attention to a quite common confusion of the two meanings that the word sensation can have. All liking (so it is said or thought) is itself sensation (of a pleasure). Hence whatever is liked, precisely inasmuch as it is liked, is agreeable (and, depending on the varying degrees or on the relation to other agreeable sensations, it is *graceful, lovely, delightful, gladdening, etc.*). But if we concede this, then sense impressions that determine inclination, or principles of reason that determine the will, or mere forms of intuition that we reflect on [and] that determine the power of judgment, will all be one and the same insofar as their effect on the feeling of pleasure is concerned, since pleasure would be the agreeableness [found] in the sensation of one's state. And since, after all, everything we do with our powers must in the end aim at the practical and unite in it as its goal, we could not require them to estimate things and their value in any other way than by the gratification they promise; how they provided it would not matter at all in the end. And since all that could make a difference in that promised gratification would be what means we select, people could no longer blame one another for baseness and malice, but only for foolishness and ignorance, since all of them, each according to his own way of viewing things, would be pursuing one and the same goal: gratification.

When [something determines the feeling of pleasure or displeasure and this] determination of that feeling is called sensation, this term means something quite different from what it means when I apply it to the presentation of a thing (through the senses, a receptivity that belongs to the cognitive power). For in the second case the presentation is referred to the object, but in the first it is referred solely to the subject and is not used for cognition at all, not even for that by which the subject *cognizes* himself.

As I have just explicated it [i.e., for the second case], the word sensation means an objective presentation of sense; and, to avoid

constantly running the risk of being misinterpreted, let us call what must always remain merely subjective, and cannot possibly be the presentation of an object, by its other customary name: feeling.<sup>12</sup> The green color of meadows belongs to *objective* sensation, i.e., to the perception of an object of sense; but the color's agreeableness belongs to *subjective* sensation, to feeling, through which no object is presented, but through which the object is regarded as an object of our liking (which is not a cognition of it).

Now, ~~that~~ a judgment by which I declare an object to be agreeable expresses an interest in that object is already obvious from the fact that, by means of sensation, the judgment arouses a desire for objects of that kind, so that the liking presupposes something other than my mere judgment about the object: it presupposes that I have referred the existence of the object to my state insofar as that state is affected by such an object. This is why we say of the agreeable not merely that we like it but that it gratifies us. When I speak of the agreeable, I am not granting mere approval: the agreeable produces an inclination. Indeed, what is agreeable in the liveliest way requires no judgment at all about the character of the object, as we can see in people who aim at nothing but enjoyment (this is the word we use to mark the intensity of the gratification): they like to dispense with all judging.

## § 4

### A Liking for the Good Is Connected with Interest<sup>13</sup>

Good is what, by means of reason, we like through its mere concept. We call something (viz., if it is something useful) *good for* [this or that] if we like it only as a means. But we call something *intrinsically good* if we like it for its own sake. In both senses of the term, the good always

<sup>12</sup>[Kant does not, however, consistently adhere to this stipulation, and the inconsistency has been left intact in the translation.]

<sup>13</sup>[Cf., in this section, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 22-26.]

contains the concept of a purpose, consequently a relation of reason to a volition (that is at least possible), and hence a liking for the existence of an object or action. In other words, it contains some interest or other.

In order to consider something good, I must always know what sort of thing the object is [meant] to be, i.e., I must have a [determinate] concept of it. But I do not need this in order to find beauty in something. Flowers, free designs, lines aimlessly intertwined and called foliage: these have no significance, depend on no determinate concept, and yet we like [*gefallen*] them. A liking [*Wohlfallen*]<sup>14</sup> for the beautiful must depend on the reflection, regarding an object, that leads to some concept or other (but it is indeterminate which concept this is). This dependence on reflection also distinguishes the liking for the beautiful from [that for] the agreeable, which rests entirely on sensation.

It is true that in many cases it seems as if the agreeable and the good are one and the same. Thus people commonly say that all gratification (especially if it lasts) is intrinsically good, which means roughly the same as to be (lastingly) agreeable and to be good are one and the same. Yet it is easy to see that in talking this way they are merely substituting one word for another by mistake, since the concepts that belong to these terms are in no way interchangeable. Insofar as we present an object as agreeable, we present it solely in relation to sense; but if we are to call the object good [as well], and hence an object of the will, we must first bring it under principles of reason, using the concept of a purpose. [So] if something that gratifies us is also called good, it has a very different relation to our liking. This is [also] evident from the fact that in the case of the good there is always the question whether it is good merely indirectly or good directly<sup>15</sup> (i.e., useful, or intrinsically good), whereas in the case of the agreeable

<sup>14</sup>[The only noun Kant had for the verb '*gefallen*' ('to be liked') was '*Wohlfallen*', and '*wohl*' does not add anything. Grammar aside, Kant uses the two interchangeably. Moreover, he uses them just as much concerning the good and the agreeable as concerning the beautiful, and what is special about the liking for the beautiful lies in what else Kant says about it, not in the word '*Wohlfallen*' itself.]

<sup>15</sup>['*Mittelbar*', '*unmittelbar*.' The more literal rendering of these as 'mediately' and 'immediately' has been avoided in this translation because 'immediately' has also its temporal sense, which would frequently be misleading.]



this question cannot even arise, since this word always signifies something that we like directly. (What we call beautiful is also liked directly.)

Even in our most ordinary speech we distinguish the agreeable from the good. If a dish stimulates [*erheben*] our tasting by its spices and other condiments, we will not hesitate to call it agreeable while granting at the same time that it is not good; for while the dish is directly *appealing* to our senses, we dislike it indirectly, i.e., as considered by reason, which looks ahead to the consequences. Even when we judge health, this difference is still noticeable. To anyone who has it, health is directly agreeable. (at least negatively, as the absence of all bodily pain). But in order to say that health is good, we must also use reason and direct this health toward purposes: we must say that health is a state that disposes us to [attend to] all our tasks. [Perhaps in the case of happiness, at least, the agreeable and the good are the same?] Surely everyone believes that happiness, the greatest sum (in number as well as duration) of what is agreeable in life, may be called a true good, indeed the highest good? And yet reason balks at this too. Agreeableness is enjoyment. But if our sole aim were enjoyment, it would be foolish to be scrupulous about the means for getting it, [i.e.] about whether we got it passively, from nature's bounty, or through our own activity and our own doing. But reason can never be persuaded that there is any intrinsic value in the existence of a human being who lives merely for *enjoyment* (no matter how industrious he may be in pursuing that aim), even if he served others, all likewise aiming only at enjoyment, as a most efficient means to it because he participated in their gratification by enjoying it through sympathy. Only by what he does without concern for enjoyment, in complete freedom and independently of whatever he could also receive passively from nature, does he give his existence [*Dasein*] an absolute value, as the existence [*Existenz* 16] of a person. Happiness, with all its abundance of agreeableness, is far from being an unconditioned good.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup>[In the *Critique of Judgment* Kant uses '*Dasein*' and '*Existenz*' synonymously, and they will both be rendered as 'existence.' Moreover, rendering '*Dasein*' as '*being*' or '*Being*' leads to serious trouble in the contexts where Kant also refers to the original being (*Wesen*); see esp. Ak. 475.]

<sup>17</sup>An obligation to enjoy oneself is a manifest absurdity. So, consequently, must be an alleged obligation to any acts that aim merely at enjoyment, no matter how intellectually subtle (or veiled) that enjoyment may be, indeed, even if it were a mystical, so-called heavenly, enjoyment.

But despite all this difference between the agreeable and the good, they do agree in this: they are always connected with an interest in their object. This holds not only for the agreeable—see § 3—and for what is good indirectly (useful), which we like as the means to something or other that is agreeable, but also for what is good absolutely and in every respect, i.e., the moral good, which carries with it the highest interest. For the good is the object of the will (a power of desire that is determined by reason). But to will something and to have a liking for its existence, i.e., to take an interest in it, are identical.

## § 5

### Comparison of the Three Sorts of Liking, Which Differ in Kind

Both the agreeable and the good refer to our power of desire and hence carry a liking with them, the agreeable a liking that is conditioned pathologically by stimuli (*stimuli*), the good a pure practical liking that is determined not just by the presentation of the object but also by the presentation of the subject's connection with the existence of the object; i.e., what we like is not just the object but its existence as well. A judgment of taste, on the other hand, is merely contemplative, i.e., it is a judgment that is indifferent to the existence of the object: it [considers] the character of the object only by holding it up to<sup>19</sup> our feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Nor is this contemplation, as such, directed to concepts, for a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment (whether theoretical or practical) and hence is neither based on concepts, nor directed to them as purposes.

<sup>18</sup>Cf. the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 212.]

<sup>19</sup>[For comparison: i.e., the feeling, as we shall see shortly (Ak. 222), is a nonconceptual awareness of a harmony (with a certain indeterminate form) between imagination and understanding; in an aesthetic judgment of reflection we hold, for comparison, a given form up to the form of that harmony.]

Hence the agreeable, the beautiful, and the good designate three different relations that presentations have to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, the feeling by reference to which we distinguish between objects or between ways of presenting them. The terms of approbation which are appropriate to each of these three are also different. We call *agreeable* what GRATIFIES us, *beautiful* what we just LIKE, *good* what we ESTEEM, or *endorse* [*billigen*], i.e., that to which we attribute [*setzen*] an objective value. Agreeableness holds for nonrational animals too; beauty only for human beings, i.e., beings who are animal and yet rational, though it is not enough that they be rational (e.g., spirits) but they must be animal as well; the good, however, holds for every rational being as such, though I cannot fully justify and explain this proposition until later. We may say that, of all these three kinds of liking, only the liking involved in taste for the beautiful is disinterested and free, since we are not compelled to give our approval by any interest, whether of sense or of reason. So we might say that [the term] liking, in the three cases mentioned, refers to *inclination*, or to *favor*, or to *respect*. For FAVOR is the only free liking. Neither an object of inclination, nor one that a law of reason enjoins on us as an object of desire, leaves us the freedom to make an object of pleasure for ourselves out of something or other. All interest either presupposes a need or gives rise to one; and, because interest is the basis that determines approval, it makes the judgment about the object unfree.

Consider, first, the interest of inclination, [which occurs] with the agreeable. Here everyone says: Hunger is the best sauce; and to people with a healthy appetite anything is tasty provided it is edible. Hence if people have a liking of this sort, that does not prove that they are selecting [*Wahl*] by taste. Only when their need has been satisfied can we tell who in a multitude of people has taste and who does not. In the same way, second, one can find manners (*conduite*) without virtue, politeness without benevolence, propriety without integrity, and so on.<sup>20</sup> For where the moral law speaks we are objectively no longer free to select what we must do; and to show taste in our conduct (or in judging other people's conduct) is very

<sup>20</sup>[I.e., taste, which is free, can manifest itself in manners, politeness, and propriety only where virtue, benevolence, and integrity, with the moral interest they involve, are absent.]

different from expressing our moral way of thinking. For this contains a command and gives rise to a need, whereas moral taste<sup>21</sup> only plays with the objects of liking without committing itself to any of them.

## Explication of the Beautiful Inferred from the First Moment

*Taste* is the ability to judge an object, or a way of presenting it, by means of a liking or disliking devoid of all interest. The object of such a liking is called *beautiful*.

## Second Moment of a Judgment of Taste, As to Its Quantity

### § 6

## The Beautiful Is What Is Presented without Concepts as the Object of a *Universal* Liking

This explication of the beautiful can be inferred from the preceding explication of it as object of a liking devoid of all interest. For if

<sup>21</sup>[As displayed in one's conduct: in manners, politeness, or propriety.]

someone likes something and is conscious that he himself does so without any interest, then he cannot help judging that it must contain a basis for being liked [that holds] for everyone. He must believe that he is justified in requiring a similar liking from everyone because he cannot discover underlying this liking, any private conditions, on which only he might be dependent, so that he must regard it as based on what he can presuppose in everyone else as well. He cannot discover such private conditions because his liking is not based on any inclination he has (nor on any other considered interest whatever); rather, the judging person feels completely free as regards the liking he accords the object. Hence he will talk about the beautiful as if beauty were a characteristic of the object and the judgment were logical (namely, a cognition of the object through concepts of it), even though in fact the judgment is only aesthetic and refers the object's presentation merely to the subject. He will talk in this way because the judgment does resemble a logical judgment inasmuch as we may presuppose it to be valid for everyone. On the other hand, this universality cannot arise from concepts. For from concepts there is no transition to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure (except in pure practical laws; but these carry an interest with them, while none is connected with pure judgments of taste). It follows that since a judgment of taste involves the consciousness that all interest is kept out of it, it must also involve a claim to being valid for everyone, but without having a universality based on concepts. In other words, a judgment of taste must involve a claim to subjective universality.

§ 7

## Comparison of the Beautiful with the Agreeable and the Good in Terms of the Above Characteristic

As regards the agreeable everyone acknowledges that his judgment, which he bases on a private feeling and by which he says that he likes some object, is by the same token confined to his own person. Hence, if he says that canary wine is agreeable he is quite content if someone else corrects his terms and reminds him to say instead: It is agreeable to me. This holds moreover not only for the taste of the tongue, palate, and throat, but also for what may be agreeable to any one's eyes and ears. To one person the color violet is gentle and lovely, to another lifeless and faded. One person loves the sound of wind instruments, another that of string instruments.<sup>22</sup> It would be foolish if we disputed about such differences with the intention of censuring another's judgment as incorrect if it differs from ours, as if the two were opposed logically. Hence about the agreeable the following principle holds: *Everyone has his own taste* (of sense<sup>23</sup>).

It is quite different (exactly the other way round) with the beautiful. It would be ridiculous if someone who prided himself on his taste tried to justify [it] by saying: This object (the building we are looking at, the garment that man is wearing, the concert we are listening to, the poem put up to be judged) is beautiful for me. For he must not call it beautiful if [he means] only [that] he<sup>24</sup> likes it. Many things may be charming and agreeable to him; no one cares about that. But if he proclaims something to be beautiful, then he requires the same liking from others; he then judges not just for himself but for everyone,

<sup>22</sup>[For an elaborate discussion of our different senses, see the *Anthropology*, §§ 15-27, Ak. VII, 153-67.]

<sup>23</sup>[As distinguished from taste of reflection.]

<sup>24</sup>[Emphasis added.]



and speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things. That is why he says: The *thing* is beautiful, and does not count on other people to agree with his judgment of liking on the ground that he has repeatedly found them agreeing with him; rather, he demands that they agree. He reproaches them if they judge differently, and denies that they have taste, which he nevertheless demands of them, as something they ought to have. In view of this [*sofern*], we cannot say that everyone has his own particular taste. That would amount to saying that there is no such thing as taste at all, no aesthetic judgment that could rightfully lay claim to everyone's assent.

And yet, even about the agreeable we can find people standing in agreement, and because of this we do, after all, deny that some people have taste while granting it to others; in speaking of taste here we do not mean the sense of taste, which involves an organ, but an ability to judge the agreeable in general. Thus we will say that someone has taste if he knows how to entertain his guests [at a party] with agreeable things (that they can enjoy by all the senses) in such a way that everyone likes [the party]. But here it is understood that the universality is only comparative, so that the rules are only *general* (as all empirical rules are), not *universal*, as are the rules that a judgment about the beautiful presupposes [*sich unternehmen*] or lays claim to. Such a judgment of taste about the agreeable refers to sociability as far as that rests on empirical rules. It is true that judgments about the good also rightfully claim to be valid for everyone, but in presenting the good as the object of a universal liking we do so *by means of a concept*, whereas this is the case neither with the beautiful nor with the agreeable.

## § 8 In a Judgment of Taste the Universality of the Liking Is Presented Only as Subjective

This special characteristic of an aesthetic judgment [of reflection], the universality to be found in judgments of taste, is a remarkable feature, not indeed for the logician but certainly for the transcendental philosopher.<sup>25</sup> This universality requires a major effort on his part if he is to discover its origin, but it compensates him for this by revealing to him a property of our cognitive power which without this analysis would have remained unknown.

We must begin by fully convincing ourselves that in making a judgment of taste (about the beautiful) we require [*ansinnen*] everyone to like the object, yet without this liking's being based on a concept (since then it would be the good), and that this claim to universal validity belongs so essentially to a judgment by which we declare something to be beautiful that it would not occur to anyone to use this term without thinking of universal validity; instead, everything we like without a concept would then be included with the agreeable. For as to the agreeable we allow everyone to be of a mind of his own, no one requiring [*zumuten*]<sup>26</sup> others to agree with his judgment of taste. But in a judgment of taste about beauty we always require others to agree. Insofar as judgments about the agreeable are merely private, whereas judgments about the beautiful are put forward as having general validity (as being public), taste regarding the agreeable can be called taste of sense, and taste regarding the beauti-

<sup>25</sup>[The transcendental philosopher tries to discover what enables us to make a priori judgments, especially synthetic ones: judgments in which the predicate is not already contained in the subject, as it is in analytic judgments, but which are nonetheless (wholly or partly) a priori rather than empirical. (See also above, Ak. 181-82, and cf. the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 298-302 = B 355-59.)]

<sup>26</sup>[*Ansinnen* and *zumuten* are used interchangeably by Kant. Both mean 'to expect' as in 'I expect you to do this,' but not in the sense of anticipation. Because of this ambiguity (found also in *erwarten*, 'to expect'), 'require' is to be preferred. (It also has just about the right force.)]

ful can be called taste of reflection, though the judgments of both are aesthetic (rather than practical) judgments about an object, [i.e.,] judgments merely about the relation that the presentation of the object has to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. But surely there is something strange here. In the case of the taste of sense, not only does experience show that its judgment (of a pleasure or displeasure we take in something or other) does not hold universally, but people, of their own accord, are modest enough not even to require others to agree (even though there actually is, at times, very widespread agreement in these judgments too). Now, experience teaches us that the taste of reflection, with its claim that its judgment (about the beautiful) is universally valid for everyone, is also rejected often enough. What is strange is that the taste of reflection should nonetheless find itself able (as it actually does) to conceive of judgments that can demand such agreement, and that it does in fact require this agreement from everyone for each of its judgments. What the people who make these judgments dispute about is not whether such a claim is possible; they are merely unable to agree, in particular cases, on the correct way to apply this ability.

Here we must note, first of all, that a universality that does not rest on concepts of the object (not even on empirical ones) is not a logical universality at all, but an aesthetic one; i.e., the [universal] quantity of the judgment is not objective but only subjective. For this quantity I use the expression *general validity*, by which I mean the validity that a presentation's reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure [may] have for every subject, rather than the validity of a presentation's reference to the cognitive power. (We may, alternatively, use just one expression, *universal validity*, for both the aesthetic and the logical quantity of a judgment, provided we add *objective* for the logical universal validity, to distinguish it from the merely subjective one, which is always aesthetic.)

Now a judgment that is *universally valid objectively* is always subjectively so too, i.e., if the judgment is valid for everything contained under a given concept, then it is also valid for everyone who presents an object by means of this concept. But if a judgment has *subjective* — i.e., aesthetic — *universal validity*, which does not rest on a concept, we cannot infer that it also has logical universal validity, because such judgments do not deal with the object [itself] at all. That is precisely why the *aesthetic universality* we attribute to a

judgment must be of a special kind; for although it does not connect the predicate of beauty with the concept of the object, considered in its entire logical sphere, yet it extends that predicate over the entire sphere of judging persons.

In their logical quantity all judgments of taste are *singular judgments*.<sup>27</sup> For since I must hold the object directly up to<sup>28</sup> my feeling of pleasure and displeasure, but without using concepts, these judgments cannot have the quantity that judgments with objective general validity have. On the other hand, once we have made a judgment of taste about an object, under the conditions characteristic for such judgments, we may then convert the singular presentation of the object into a concept by comparing it [with other presentations] and so arrive at a logically universal judgment. For example, I may look at a rose and make a judgment of taste declaring it to be beautiful. But if I compare many singular roses and so arrive at the judgment, Roses in general are beautiful, then my judgment is no longer merely aesthetic, but is a logical judgment based on an aesthetic one. Now the judgment, The rose is agreeable (in its smell), is also aesthetic and singular, but it is a judgment of sense, not of taste. For a judgment of taste carries with it an *aesthetic quantity* of universality, i.e., of validity for everyone, which a judgment about the agreeable does not have. Only judgments about the good, though they too determine our liking for an object, have logical rather than merely aesthetic universality; for they hold for the object, as cognitions of it, and hence for everyone.

If we judge objects merely in terms of concepts, then we lose all presentation of beauty. This is why there can be no rule by which someone could be compelled to acknowledge that something is beautiful. No one can use reasons or principles to talk us into a judgment on whether some garment, house, or flower is beautiful. We want to submit the object to our own eyes, just as if our liking of it depended on that sensation. And yet, if we then call the object beautiful, we believe we have a universal voice, and lay claim to the

<sup>27</sup>[In the *Logic*, Kant spells out the (familiar) distinctions between universal, particular, and singular judgments in terms of inclusion and exclusion, total or partial, of the spheres of subject and predicate concepts, and also distinguishes universal from general propositions: Ak. IX, 102-03.]

<sup>28</sup>[See above, Ak. 209 br. n. 19.]

<sup>29</sup>[Kant meant to say 'universal'.]

agreement of everyone, whereas any private sensation would decide solely for the observer himself and his liking.

We can see, at this point, that nothing is postulated in a judgment of taste except such a *universal voice* about a liking unmediated by concepts. Hence all that is postulated is the *possibility of a judgment* that is aesthetic and yet can be considered valid for everyone. The judgment of taste itself does not *postulate* everyone's agreement (since only a logically universal judgment can do that, because it can adduce reasons); it merely *requires* this agreement from everyone, as an instance of the rule, an instance regarding which it expects confirmation not from concepts but from the agreement of others. Hence the universal voice is only an idea. (At this point we are not yet inquiring on what this idea rests.) Whether someone who believes he is making a judgment of taste is in fact judging in conformity with that idea may be uncertain; but by using the term beauty he indicates that he is at least referring his judging to that idea, and hence that he intends it to be a judgment of taste. For himself, however, he can attain certainty on this point,<sup>30</sup> by merely being conscious that he is separating whatever belongs to the agreeable and the good from the liking that remains to him after that. It is only for this that he counts on everyone's assent, and he would under these conditions [always] be justified in this claim, if only he did not on occasion fail to observe these conditions and so make an erroneous judgment of taste.)

<sup>30</sup> Presumably the point that in a given case "may be uncertain" (at the outset) whether he is in fact judging in conformity with the idea of the universal voice. For the sources of error about to be mentioned (in this sentence), cf. Ak. 290-91 incl. n. 15 at Ak. 290, as well as § 39, Ak. 293, and § 40, Ak. 293-94. See also Ted Cohen, "Why Beauty Is a Symbol of Morality," in *Essays in Kant's Aesthetics*, eds. Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 221-36.]

## § 9

## Investigation of the Question Whether in a Judgment of Taste the Feeling of Pleasure Precedes the Judging of the Object or the Judging Precedes the Pleasure

The solution of this problem is the key to the critique of taste and hence deserves full attention.

If the pleasure in the given object came first, and our judgment of taste were to attribute only the pleasure's universal communicability to the presentation of the object, then this procedure would be self-contradictory. For that kind of pleasure would be none other than mere agreeableness in the sensation, so that by its very nature it could have only private validity, because it would depend directly on the presentation by which the object is given.

Hence it must be the universal communicability of the mental state, in the given presentation, which underlies the judgment of taste as its subjective condition, and the pleasure in the object must be its consequence. Nothing, however, can be communicated universally except cognition, as well as presentation insofar as it pertains to cognition; for presentation is objective only insofar as it pertains to cognition, and only through this does it have a universal reference point with which everyone's presentational power is compelled to harmonize. If, then, we are to think that the judgment about this universal communicability of the presentation has a merely subjective determining basis, i.e., one that does not involve a concept of the object, then this basis can be nothing other than the mental state that we find in the relation between the presentational powers [imagination

and understanding] insofar as they refer a given presentation to *cognition in general*.

When this happens, the cognitive powers brought into play by this presentation are in free play, because no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. Hence the mental state in this presentation must be a feeling, accompanying the given presentation, of a free play of the presentational powers directed to cognition in general. Now if a presentation by which an object is given is, in general, to become cognition, we need *imagination* to combine the manifold of intuition, and *understanding* to provide the unity of the concept uniting the [component] presentations. This state of *free play* of the cognitive powers, accompanying a presentation by which an object is given, must be universally communicable; for cognition, the determination of the object with which given presentations are to harmonize (in any subject whatever) is the only way of presenting that holds for everyone.

But the way of presenting [which occurs] in a judgment of taste is to have subjective universal communicability without presupposing a determinate concept: hence this subjective universal communicability can be nothing but [that of] the mental state in which we are when imagination and understanding are in free play (insofar as they harmonize with each other as required for *cognition in general*). For we are conscious that this subjective relation suitable for cognition in general must hold just as much for everyone, and hence be just as universally communicable, as any determinate cognition, since cognition always rests on that relation as its subjective condition.

Now this merely subjective (aesthetic) judging of the object, or of the presentation by which it is given, precedes the pleasure in the object and is the basis of this pleasure, [a pleasure] in the harmony of the cognitive powers. But the universal subjective validity of this liking, the liking we connect with the presentation of the object we call beautiful, is based solely on the mentioned universality of the subjective conditions for judging objects.

That the ability to communicate one's mental state, even if this is only the state of one's cognitive powers, carries a pleasure with it, could easily be established (empirically and psychologically) from man's natural propensity to sociability. But that would not suffice for our aim here. When we make a judgment of taste, the pleasure we feel is something we require from everyone else as necessary, just as

if, when we call something beautiful, we had to regard beauty as a characteristic of the object, determined in it according to concepts, even though in fact, apart from a reference to the subject's feeling, beauty is nothing by itself. We must, however, postpone discussion of this question until we have answered another one, namely, whether and how aesthetic judgments are possible a priori.

At present we still have to deal with a lesser question, namely, how we become conscious, in a judgment of taste, of a reciprocal subjective harmony between the cognitive powers: is it aesthetically, through mere inner sense and sensation? or is it intellectually, through consciousness of the intentional activity by which we bring these powers into play?

If the given presentation that prompts the judgment of taste were a concept which, in our judgment of the object, united understanding and imagination so as to give rise to cognition of the object, then the consciousness of this relation would be intellectual (as it is in the objective schematism of judgment, with which the *Critique [of Pure Reason]* deals<sup>31</sup>). But in that case the judgment would not have been made in reference to pleasure and displeasure and hence would not be a judgment of taste. But in fact a judgment of taste determines the object, independently of concepts, with regard to liking and the predicate of beauty. Hence that unity in the relation [between the cognitive powers] in the subject can reveal itself only through sensation.

This sensation, whose universal communicability a judgment of taste postulates, is the quickening of the two powers (imagination and understanding) to an activity that is indeterminate but, as a result of the prompting of the given presentation, nonetheless accordant: the activity required for cognition in general. An objective relation can only be thought. Still, insofar as it has subjective conditions, it can nevertheless be sensed in the effect it has on the mind; and if the relation is not based on a concept (e.g., the relation that the presentational powers must have in order to give rise to a power of cognition in general), then the only way we can become conscious of it is through a sensation of this relation's effect: the facilitated play of the two mental powers (imagination and understanding) quickened by their reciprocal harmony. A presentation that, though singular and not compared with others, yet harmonizes with the conditions of the

<sup>31</sup>See A 137-47 = B 176-87, and cf. below, Ak. 253 ff. n. 17.]

universality that is the business of the understanding in general, brings the cognitive powers into that proportioned attunement which we require for all cognition and which, therefore, we also consider valid for everyone who is so constituted as to judge by means of understanding and the senses in combination (in other words, for all human beings).

## Explication of the Beautiful Inferred from the Second Moment

*Beautiful* is what, without a concept, is liked universally.

## Third Moment of Judgments of Taste, As to the Relation of Purposes That Is Taken into Consideration in Them

### § 10

## On Purposiveness in General

What is a purpose? If we try to explicate it in terms of its transcendental attributes (without presupposing anything empirical, such as the feeling of pleasure), then a purpose is the object of a concept insofar as we regard this concept as the object's cause (the real basis of its

possibility); and the causality that a *concept* has with regard to its *object* is purposiveness (*forma finalis*<sup>32</sup>). Hence we think of a purpose if we think not merely, say, of our cognition of the object, but instead of the object-itself (its form, or its existence), as an effect that is possible only through a concept of that effect. In that case the presentation of the effect is the basis that determines the effect's cause and precedes it. Consciousness of a presentation's causality directed at the subject's state so as to *keep* him in that state, may here designate generally what we call pleasure; whereas displeasure is that presentation which contains the basis that determines [the subject to change] the state [consisting] of [certain] presentations into their own opposite (i.e. to keep them away or remove them).

The power of desire, insofar as it can be determined to act only by concepts, i.e. in conformity with the presentation of a purpose, would be the will.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, we do call objects, states of mind, or acts purposive even if their possibility does not necessarily presuppose the presentation of a purpose; we do this merely because we can explain and grasp them only if we assume that they are based on a causality [that operates] according to purposes, i.e., on a will that would have so arranged them in accordance with the presentation of a certain rule. Hence there can be purposiveness without a purpose, insofar as we do not posit the causes of this form in a will, and yet can grasp the explanation of its possibility only by deriving it from a will. Now what we observe we do not always need to have insight into by reason (as to how it is possible). Hence we can at least observe a purposiveness as to form and take note of it in objects—even if only by reflection—without basing it on a purpose (as the matter of the *nexus finalis*<sup>34</sup>).

<sup>32</sup>[Purposive form. Concerning the use of 'purposiveness' for 'Zweckmäßigkeit,' see above, Ak. 167 br. n. 4.]

<sup>33</sup>[Cf. the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 58-59, and the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 384-85.]

<sup>34</sup>[Purposive connection.]



## A Judgment of Taste Is Based on Nothing but the *Form of Purposiveness* of an Object (or of the Way of Presenting It)

Whenever a purpose is regarded as the basis of a liking, it always carries with it an interest, as the basis that determines the judgment about the object of the pleasure. Hence a judgment of taste cannot be based on a subjective purpose. But a judgment of taste also cannot be determined by a presentation of an objective purpose, i.e., a presentation of the object itself as possible according to principles of connection in terms of purposes, and hence it cannot be determined by a concept of the good. For it is an aesthetic and not a cognitive judgment, and hence does not involve a *concept* of the character and internal or external possibility of the object through this or that cause; rather, it involves merely the relation of the presentational powers to each other, insofar as they are determined by a presentation.

Now this relation, [present] when [judgment] determines an object as beautiful, is connected with the feeling of a pleasure, a pleasure that the judgment of taste at the same time declares to be valid for everyone. Hence neither an agreeableness accompanying the presentation, nor a presentation of the object's perfection and the concept of the good, can contain the basis that determines [such a judgment]. Therefore the liking that, without a concept, we judge to be universally communicable and hence to be the basis that determines a judgment of taste, can be nothing but the subjective purposiveness in the presentation of an object, without any purpose (whether objective or subjective), and hence the mere form of purposiveness, insofar as we are conscious of it, in the presentation by which an object is given us.

(subjective purposiveness without any purpose)  
the mere form of purposiveness

## A Judgment of Taste Rests on A Priori Bases

We cannot possibly tell a priori that some presentation or other (sensation or concept) is connected, as cause, with the feeling of a pleasure or displeasure, as its effect. For that would be a causal relation, and a causal relation (among objects of experience) can never be cognized otherwise than a posteriori and by means of experience itself.<sup>35</sup> It is true that in the *Critique of Practical Reason* we did actually derive a priori from universal moral concepts the feeling of respect (a special and peculiar modification of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure which does seem to differ somehow from both the pleasure and the displeasure we get from empirical objects).<sup>36</sup> But there we were also able to go beyond the bounds of experience and appeal to a causality that rests on a supersensible characteristic of the subject, namely, freedom. And yet, even there, what we derived from the idea of the moral, as the cause, was actually not this *feeling*, but merely the determination of the will, except that the state of mind of a will determined by something or other is in itself already a feeling of pleasure and is identical with it. Hence the determination of the will [by the moral law] does not [in turn] come about as an effect from the feeling of pleasure, [with that feeling being produced by the concept of the moral]; this we would have to assume only if the concept of the moral, as a good [and so as giving rise to respect, the pleasure], preceded the will's determination by the law;<sup>37</sup> but in that case the concept of the moral would be a mere cognition, and so it would be futile to [try to] derive from it the pleasure connected with it.

<sup>35</sup>[We cognize a priori only that every event must have some cause; what causes produce what effects, we discover by observation.]

<sup>36</sup>[For this derivation, and for a comparison with this entire paragraph, see the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 71-89. Cf. also the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 211-13.]

<sup>37</sup>[The feeling of pleasure would then mediate this determination.]

(Kantian)

222

Now the situation is similar with the pleasure in an aesthetic judgment, except that here the pleasure is merely contemplative, and does not bring about an interest in the object, whereas in a moral judgment it is practical.<sup>38</sup> The very consciousness of a merely formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's cognitive powers, accompanying a presentation by which an object is given, is that pleasure. For this consciousness in an aesthetic judgment contains a basis for determining the subject's activity regarding the quickening of his cognitive powers, and hence an inner causality (which is purposive) concerning cognition in general, which however is not restricted to a determinate cognition. Hence it contains a mere form of the subjective purposiveness of a presentation. This pleasure is also not practical in any way, neither like the one arising from the pathological basis, agreeableness, nor like the one arising from the intellectual basis, the conceived good. Yet it does have a causality in it, namely, to keep [us in] the state of [having] the presentation itself, and [to keep] the cognitive powers engaged [in their occupation] without any further aim. We linger in our contemplation of the beautiful, because this contemplation reinforces and reproduces itself. This is analogous to (though not the same as) the way in which we linger over something charming that, as we present an object, repeatedly arouses our attention, [though here] the mind is passive.

## § 13

## A Pure Judgment of Taste Is Independent of Charm and Emotion

All interest ruins a judgment of taste and deprives it of its impartiality, especially if, instead of making the purposiveness precede the feeling of pleasure as the interest of reason does, that interest bases the purposiveness on the feeling of pleasure; but this is what always

<sup>38</sup>[Cf. the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 212.]

happens in an aesthetic judgment that we make about something insofar as it gratifies or pains us. Hence judgments affected in this way can make either no claim at all to a universally valid liking, or a claim that is diminished to the extent that sensations of that kind are included among the bases determining the taste. (Any taste remains barbaric if its liking requires that charms and emotions be mingled in, let alone if it makes these the standard of its approval.)

And yet, (though beauty should actually concern only form), charms are frequently not only included with beauty, as a contribution toward a universal aesthetic liking, but are even themselves passed off as beauties, so that the matter of the liking is passed off as the form. This is a misunderstanding that, like many others having yet some basis in truth, can be eliminated by carefully defining these concepts.

A pure judgment of taste is one that is not influenced by charm or emotion (though these may be connected with a liking for the beautiful), and whose determining basis is therefore merely the purposiveness of the form.

## § 14

## Elucidation by Examples

Aesthetic judgments, just like theoretical (i.e., logical) ones, can be divided into empirical and pure. Aesthetic judgments are empirical if they assert that an object or a way of presenting it is agreeable or disagreeable; they are pure if they assert that it is beautiful. Empirical aesthetic judgments are judgments of sense (material aesthetic judgments); only pure aesthetic judgments (since they are formal) are properly judgments of taste.

Hence a judgment of taste is pure only insofar as no merely empirical liking is mingled in with the basis that determines it. But this is just what happens whenever charm or emotion have a share in a judgment by which something is to be declared beautiful.

Here again some will raise objections, trying to make out, not merely that charm is a necessary ingredient in beauty, but indeed that

it is sufficient all by itself to [deserve] being called beautiful. Most people will declare a mere color, such as the green color of a lawn, or a mere tone (as distinct from sound and noise), as for example that of a violin, to be beautiful in themselves, even though both seem to be based merely on the matter of presentations, i.e., solely on sensation, and hence deserve only to be called agreeable. And yet it will surely be noticed at the same time that sensations of color as well as of tone claim to deserve being considered beautiful only insofar as they are *pure*. And that is an attribute that already concerns form, and it is moreover all that can be universally communicated with certainty about these presentations; for we cannot assume that in all subjects the sensations themselves agree in quality, let alone that everyone will judge one color more agreeable than another, or judge the tone of one musical instrument more agreeable than that of another.

If, following Euler,<sup>39</sup> we assume that colors are vibrations (*pulsus*) of the aether in uniform temporal sequence, as, in the case of sound, tones are such vibrations of the air, and if we assume—what is most important (and which, after all, I do not doubt at all<sup>40</sup>)—that the mind perceives not only, by sense, the effect that these vibrations have on the excitement of the organ, but also, by reflection, the

<sup>39</sup>[Leonhard Euler (1707–83), Swiss mathematician, physicist, and physiologist. He is the author of many works and became a member of the Academies of Science, respectively, of St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Paris.]

<sup>40</sup>['Woran ich doch gar nicht zweifle,' incorporated into the *Akademie* text from the third edition. Both the first and the second edition had 'woran ich doch gar sehr zweifle', i.e., which, however, I doubt very much.' Wilhelm Windelband, in his notes to the *Akademie* edition of the *Critique of Judgment*, points out (Ak. V, 527–29) that Kant's treatment of color and sound in this *Critique* (as allowing reflection on their form) presupposes Euler's view, and that Kant also speaks very favorably of it in these other places: *Meditationum quarundam de igne succincta delineatio* (*Brief Outline of Some Reflections Concerning Fire* [1755]), Ak. I, 378; and *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786), Ak. IV, the n. on 519–20. On the other hand, in the *Anthropology* (Ak. VII, 156) Kant writes: "Sight too is a sense [involving] indirect [or mediate: 'mittelbar'] sensation by means of [durch] a matter in motion, light, which only a certain organ (the eyes) can sense. Unlike sound, light is not merely a wavelike motion of a fluid element, which spreads in all directions in the surrounding space; rather, it is an emanation by which a point in space is determined for the object...." But the 'not merely' at least can be read in a way that makes this passage compatible with Windelband's evidence and hence with the third edition reading adopted here. Cf., on this whole issue, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., *The Notion of Form in Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 22–26.]

regular play of the impressions (and hence the form in the connection of different presentations), then color and tone would not be mere sensations but would already be the formal determination of the manifold in these, in which case they could even by themselves be considered beauties.

But what we call pure in a simple kind of sensation is its uniformity, undisturbed and uninterrupted by any alien sensation. It pertains only to form, because there we can abstract from the quality of the kind of sensation in question (as to which color or tone, if any, is presented). That is why all simple colors, insofar as they are pure, are considered beautiful; mixed colors do not enjoy this privilege, precisely because, since they are not simple, we lack a standard for judging whether we should call them pure or impure.

But the view that the beauty we attribute to an object on account of its form is actually capable of being heightened by charm is a vulgar error that is very prejudicial to genuine, uncorrupted, solid [*gründlich*] taste. It is true that charms may be added to beauty as a supplement: they may offer the mind more than that dry liking, by also making the presentation of the object interesting to it, and hence they may commend to us taste and its cultivation, above all if our taste is still crude and unpracticed. But charms do actually impair the judgment of taste if they draw attention to themselves as [if they were] bases for judging beauty. For the view that they contribute to beauty is so far off the mark that it is in fact only as aliens that they must, indulgently, be granted admittance when taste is still weak and unpracticed, and only insofar as they do not interfere with the beautiful form.

In painting, in sculpture, indeed in all the visual arts, including architecture and horticulture insofar as they are fine arts, *design* is what is essential: in design the basis for any involvement of taste is not what gratifies us in sensation, but merely what we like because of its form. The colors that illuminate the outline belong to charm. Though they can indeed make the object itself vivid to sense, they cannot make it beautiful and worthy of being beheld. Rather, usually the requirement of beautiful form severely restricts [what] colors [may be used], and even where the charm [of colors] is admitted it is still only the form that refines the colors.

All form of objects of the senses (the outer senses or, indirectly, the inner sense as well) is either *shape* or *play*; if the latter, it is either

play of shapes (in space, namely, mimetic art and dance), or mere play of sensations (in time). The *charm* of colors or of the agreeable tone of an instrument may be added, but it is the *design* in the first case and the *composition* in the second that constitute the proper object of a pure judgment of taste; that the purity of the colors and of the tones, or for that matter their variety and contrast, seem to contribute to the beauty, does not mean that, because they themselves are agreeable, they furnish us, as it were, with a supplement to, and one of the same kind as, our liking for the form. For all they do is to make the form intuitable more precisely, determinately, and completely, while they also enliven the presentation by means of their charm, by arousing and sustaining the attention we direct toward the object itself.

Even what we call *ornaments* (*parerga*), i.e., what does not belong to the whole presentation of the object as an intrinsic constituent, but [is] only an extrinsic addition, does indeed increase our taste's liking, and yet it too does so only by its form, as in the case of picture frames, or drapery on statues, or colonnades around magnificent buildings. On the other hand, if the ornament itself does not consist in beautiful form but is merely attached, as a gold frame is to a painting so that its charm may commend the painting for our approval, then it impairs genuine beauty and is called *finery*.

*Emotion*, a sensation where agreeableness is brought about only by means of a momentary inhibition of the vital force followed by a stronger outpouring of it, does not belong to beauty at all. But sublimity (with which the feeling of emotion is connected) requires a different standard of judging from the one that taste uses as a basis. Hence a pure judgment of taste has as its determining basis neither charm nor emotion, in other words, no sensation, which is [merely] the matter of an aesthetic judgment.

## A Judgment of Taste Is Wholly Independent of the Concept of Perfection

*Objective* purposiveness can be cognized only by referring the manifold to a determinate purpose, and hence through a concept. Even from this it is already evident that the beautiful, which we judge on the basis of a merely formal purposiveness, i.e., a purposiveness without a purpose, is quite independent of the concept of the good. For the good presupposes an objective purposiveness, i.e., it presupposes that we refer the object to a determinate purpose.

Objective purposiveness may be extrinsic, in which case it is an object's *utility*, or intrinsic, in which case it is an object's *perfection*. If our liking for an object is one on account of which we call the object beautiful, then it cannot rest on a concept of the object's utility, as is sufficiently clear from the two preceding chapters;<sup>41</sup> for then it would not be a direct liking for the object, while that is the essential condition of a judgment about beauty. But perfection, which is an objective intrinsic purposiveness, is somewhat closer to the predicate beauty, and that is why some philosophers of repute have identified perfection with beauty, adding, however, that it is *perfection thought confusedly*.<sup>42</sup> It is of the utmost importance, in a critique of taste, to decide if indeed beauty can actually be analyzed into the concept of perfection.

In order to judge objective purposiveness, we always need the concept of a purpose, and (if the purposiveness is not to be extrinsic—utility—but intrinsic) it must be the concept of an intrinsic [inner] purpose that contains the basis for the object's inner<sup>43</sup> [inner] possi-

<sup>41</sup>[The chapters on the first two moments of a judgment of taste, Ak. 203-19.]

<sup>42</sup>[Kant is responding to aestheticians of the Leibnizian school, especially Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and Georg Friedrich Meier. See the Translator's Introduction, xviii-l.]

<sup>43</sup>[The German 'inner' is rendered as 'inner' when it modifies 'possibility,' because 'intrinsic possibility' means 'possibility in principle.']

bility. Now insofar as a purpose as such is something whose *concept* can be regarded as the basis of the possibility of the object itself, presenting objective purposiveness in a thing presupposes the concept of the thing, i.e., *what sort of thing it is [meant] to be*; and the harmony of the thing's manifold with this concept (which provides the rule for connecting this manifold) is the thing's *qualitative perfection*. Qualitative perfection is quite distinct from *quantitative perfection*.<sup>44</sup> The latter is the completeness that any thing [may] have as a thing of its kind. It is a mere concept of magnitude (of totality); in its case *what the thing is [meant] to be* is already thought in advance as determined, and the only question is whether the thing has *everything* that is required for being a thing of that kind. What is formal in the presentation of a thing, the harmony of its manifold to [form] a unity (where it is indeterminate what this unity is [meant] to be) does not by itself reveal any objective purposiveness whatsoever. For here we abstract from what this unity is *as a purpose* (what the thing is [meant] to be), so that nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of the presentations in the mind of the beholder. Subjective purposiveness [is] merely a certain purposiveness of the subject's presentational state and, within that state, [an] appealingness [involved] in apprehending a given form by the imagination. Such purposiveness does not indicate any perfection of any object whatever, [since] no object is being thought through any concept of a purpose. Suppose, for example, that in a forest I come upon a lawn encircled by trees but that I do not connect with it the thought of any purpose, e.g., that it is [meant] (say) for a country dance. In that case no concept whatsoever of perfection is given me through the mere form. But the thought of a formal *objective* purposiveness that nevertheless lacks a purpose, i.e., the mere form of a *perfection* (without any matter and *concept* of what the harmony is directed to, not even the mere idea of a lawfulness as such) is a veritable contradiction.

Now a judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, i.e., a judgment that rests on subjective bases, and whose determining basis cannot be a concept and hence also cannot be the concept of a determinate purpose. Hence in thinking of beauty, a formal subjective purposiveness, we are not at all thinking of a perfection in the object, an allegedly formal and yet also objective purposiveness; and the distinction between

<sup>44</sup>[Cf. the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 386.]

the concepts of the beautiful and of the good which alleges that the two differ only in their logical form, with the first merely being a confused and the second a distinct concept of perfection, while the two are otherwise the same in content and origin, is in error. For in that case there would be no difference *in kind* between them, but a judgment of taste would be just as much a cognitive judgment as is a judgment by which we declare something to be good. So, for example, the common man bases his judgment that deceit is wrong on confused rational principles, and the philosopher bases his on distinct ones, but both at bottom base their judgments on one and the same rational principles. In fact, however, as I have already pointed out, an aesthetic judgment is unique in kind and provides absolutely no cognition (not even a confused one) of the object; only a logical judgment does that. An aesthetic judgment instead refers the presentation, by which an object is given, solely to the subject: it brings to our notice no characteristic of the object, but only the purposive form in the [way] the presentational powers are determined in their engagement with the object. Indeed, the judgment is called aesthetic precisely because the basis determining it is not a concept but the feeling (of the inner sense) of that accordance in the play of the mental powers insofar as it can only be sensed. If, on the other hand, we wished to call confused concepts and the objective judgment based on them aesthetic, then we would have an understanding that judges by sense [*sinnlich*], or a sense that presents its objects by means of concepts, both of which are contradictory. Our power of concepts, whether they are confused or distinct, is the understanding; and although understanding too is required (as it is for all judgments) for a judgment of taste, as an aesthetic judgment, yet it is required here not as an ability to cognize an object, but as an ability to determine (without a concept) the judgment and its presentation in accordance with the relation that this presentation has to the subject and his inner feeling, namely, so far as this judgment is possible in accordance with a universal rule.

<sup>45</sup>[From Greek *αἰσθησθῆναι* (aisthésthai), 'to sense', in the broad meaning of this term, which includes feeling. The Greek term thus shares the ambiguity of 'to sense' and of 'empfinden.' Cf. Ak. 205-06.]



## A Judgment of Taste by Which We Declare an Object Beautiful under the Condition of a Determinate Concept Is Not Pure

There are two kinds of beauty, free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*) and merely accessory beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). Free beauty does not presuppose a concept of what the object is [meant] to be. Accessory beauty does presuppose such a concept, as well as the object's perfection in terms of that concept. The free kinds of beauty are called (self-subsistent) beauties of this or that thing. The other kind of beauty is accessory to a concept (i.e., it is conditioned beauty) and as such is attributed to objects that fall under the concept of a particular purpose.

Flowers are free natural beauties. Hardly anyone apart from the botanist knows what sort of thing a flower is [meant] to be; and even he, while recognizing it as the reproductive organ of a plant, pays no attention to this natural purpose when he judges the flower by taste. Hence the judgment is based on no perfection of any kind, no intrinsic purposiveness to which the combination of the manifold might refer. Many birds (the parrot, the humming-bird, the bird of paradise) and a lot of crustaceans in the sea are [free] beauties themselves [and] belong to no object determined by concepts as to its purpose, but we like them freely and on their own account. Thus designs à la grecque,<sup>46</sup> the foliage on borders or on wallpaper, etc.,

<sup>46</sup>Walter Cerf notes: "The phrase à la grecque was apparently used in the eighteenth century—and is still used by some present-day French art historians—to characterize the classicism in what is now called the Louis XVI style. Stimulated by the excavations at Pompeii, which began around 1748, the style à la grecque put an end to the style rocaille or rococo (rocaille, rock or grotto work) of Louis XV and flourished from about 1760 to 1792. . . ." From Walter Cerf's translation of part of the *Critique of Judgment*, entitled *Analytic of the Beautiful* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 111.]

mean nothing on their own: they represent [*vorstellen*] nothing, no object under a determinate concept, and are free beauties. What we call fantasias in music (namely, music without a topic [*Thema*]), indeed all music not set to words, may also be included in the same class.

When we judge free beauty (according to mere form) then our judgment of taste is pure. Here we presuppose no concept of any purpose for which the manifold is to serve the given object, and hence no concept [as to] what the object is [meant] to represent; our imagination is playing, as it were, while it contemplates the shape, and such a concept would only restrict its freedom.

But the beauty of a human being (and, as kinds subordinate to a human being, the beauty of a man or woman or child), or the beauty of a horse or of a building (such as a church, palace, armory, or summer-house) does presuppose the concept of the purpose that determines what the thing is [meant] to be, and hence a concept of its perfection, and so it is merely adherent beauty. Now just as a connection of beauty, which properly concerns only form, with the agreeable (the sensation) prevented the judgment of taste from being pure, so does a connection of beauty with the good (i.e., as to how, in terms of the thing's purpose, the manifold is good for the thing itself) impair the purity of a judgment of taste.

Much that would be liked directly in intuition could be added to a building, if only the building were not [meant] to be a church. A figure could be embellished with all sorts of curlicues and light but regular lines, as the New Zealanders do with their tattoos, if only it were not the figure of a human being. And this human being might have had much more delicate features and a facial structure with a softer and more likable outline, if only he were not [meant] to represent a man, let alone a warlike one.

Now if a liking for the manifold in a thing refers to the intrinsic purpose that determines [how] the thing is possible, then it is a liking based on a concept, whereas a liking for beauty is one that presupposes no concept but is directly connected with the presentation by which the object is given (not by which it is thought). Now if a judgment of taste regarding the second liking is made to depend on, and hence is restricted by, the purpose involved in the first liking, it is a rational judgment, and so it is no longer a free and pure judgment of taste.

-Merrill  
-Cerf  
-Cerf  
-Cerf

It is true that taste gains by such a connection of aesthetic with intellectual liking, for it becomes fixed and, though it is not universal, rules can be prescribed for it with regard to certain objects that are purposively determined. By the same token, however, these rules will not be rules of taste but will merely be rules for uniting taste with reason, i.e., the beautiful with the good, a union that enables us to use the beautiful as an instrument for our aim regarding the good, so that the mental attunement that sustains itself and has subjective universal validity may serve as a basis for that other way of thinking that can be sustained only by laborious resolve but that is universally valid objectively.<sup>47</sup> Actually, however, neither does perfection gain by beauty, nor beauty by perfection. Rather, because in using a concept in order to compare the presentation by which an object is given us with that object itself (with regard to what it is [meant] to be), we inevitably hold the presentation up to the sensation in the subject, it is the *complete power* of presentation that gains when the two states of mind harmonize.

A judgment of taste about an object that has a determinate intrinsic purpose would be pure only if the judging person either had no concept of this purpose, or if he abstracted from it in making his judgment. But although he would in that case have made a correct judgment of taste, by judging the object as a free beauty, another person who (looking only to the object's purpose) regarded the beauty in it as only an accessory characteristic, would still censure him and accuse him of having wrong taste, even though each is judging correctly in his own way, the one by what he has before his senses, the other by what he has in his thoughts. If we make this distinction we can settle many quarrels that judges of taste have about beauty, by showing them that the one is concerned with free and the other with accessory beauty, the one making a pure and the other an applied judgment of taste.

<sup>47</sup>[On the link between the beautiful and the good, cf. § 42 (Ak. 298-303) and § 59 (Ak. 351-54), as well as the *Anthropology*, § § 69-70, Ak. VII, 244-45.]

## § 17

## On the Ideal of Beauty

There can be no objective rule of taste, no rule of taste that determines by concepts what is beautiful. For any judgment from this source [i.e., taste] is aesthetic, i.e., the basis determining it is the subject's feeling and not the concept of an object. If we search for a principle of taste that states the universal criterion of the beautiful by means of determinate concepts, then we engage in a fruitless endeavor, because we search for something that is impossible and intrinsically contradictory. The universal communicability<sup>48</sup> of the sensation (of liking or disliking)—a universal communicability that is indeed not based on a concept—[I say that] the broadest possible agreement among all ages and peoples regarding this feeling that accompanies the presentation of certain objects is the empirical criterion [for what is beautiful]. This criterion, although weak and barely sufficient for a conjecture, [does suggest] that a taste so much confirmed by examples stems from [a] deeply hidden basis, common to all human beings, underlying their agreement in judging the forms under which objects are given them.

That is why we regard some products of taste as *exemplary*. This does not mean that taste can be acquired by imitating someone else's. For taste must be an ability one has oneself; and although someone who imitates a model may manifest skill insofar as he succeeds in this, he manifests taste only insofar as he can judge that model himself.<sup>49</sup> From this, however, it follows that the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea, an idea which everyone must generate within himself and by which he must judge any object of taste, any example of someone's judging by taste, and even the taste of everyone [else].

<sup>48</sup>[Cf. § § 20-21 (Ak. 237-39) and § § 39-40 (Ak. 291-96).]

<sup>49</sup>Models of taste in the arts of speech must be composed in a language both dead and scholarly; dead, so that it will not have to undergo the changes that inevitably affect living ones, whereby noble expressions become flat, familiar ones archaic, and newly created ones enter into circulation for only a short while; scholarly, so that it will have a grammar that is not subject to the whims of fashion but has its own unalterable rule.

Idea properly means a rational concept, and *ideal* the presentation of an individual being as adequate to an idea.<sup>50</sup> Hence that archetype of taste, which does indeed rest on reason's indeterminate idea of a maximum, but which still can be presented not through concepts but only in an individual exhibition,<sup>51</sup> may more appropriately be called the ideal of the beautiful. Though we do not have such an ideal in our possession, we do strive to produce it within us. But it will be merely an ideal of the imagination, precisely because it does not rest on concepts but rests on an exhibition, and the power of exhibition is the imagination. How, then, do we arrive at such an ideal of beauty? Do we do so a priori or empirically? Also, which type of the beautiful admits of an ideal?

We must be careful to note, first of all, that if we are to seek an ideal of beauty then the beauty must be *fixed* rather than *vague*, fixed by a concept of objective purposiveness. Hence this beauty must belong not to the object of an entirely pure judgment of taste, but to the object of a partly intellectual one. In other words, if an ideal is to be located in any kind of bases for judging, then there must be some underlying idea of reason, governed by determinate concepts, that determines a priori the purpose on which the object's inner possibility rests. An ideal of beautiful flowers, of beautiful furnishings, or of a beautiful view is unthinkable. But an ideal of a beauty that is accessory to determinate purposes is also inconceivable, e.g., an ideal

<sup>50</sup>[Cf. the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 567-71 = B 595-99.]

<sup>51</sup>[Cf. Ak. 192, where 'to exhibit' (*darstellen*) is defined as 'to place beside [a] concept an intuition corresponding to it.' In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, 'to construct a concept' is defined as 'to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it' (A 713 = B 741). Apart from that context (A 713-21 = B 741-49), the term *darstellen* rarely occurs in the first *Critique*, even where construction of concepts is discussed. By the time of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant uses it frequently, and broadens it to include not only *schematic* exhibition (as, e.g., in construction) but also *symbolic* exhibition. See esp. § 59, (Ak. 351-54) as well as br. n. 31 at Ak. 351. See also the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 23, and the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 486, and cf. the *Anthropology*, Ak. VII, 167-97. See also Kant's response to Johann August Eberhard in *On a Discovery According to Which Any New Critique of Pure Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One*, Ak. VIII, 185-251. The traditional rendering of *darstellen* as 'to present' has been abandoned in this translation because 'to exhibit' seems both closer to Kant's meaning and less misleading. (Similarly for the noun.) 'To present' has been used instead to replace the traditional rendering of '*vorstellen*': as 'to represent', which wrongly suggests that Kant's theory of perception (etc.) is representational. Cf. above, Ak. 175 br. n. 17.]

of a beautiful mansion, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, etc., presumably because the purposes are not sufficiently determined and fixed by their concept, so that the purposiveness is nearly as free as in the case of *vague* beauty. [This leaves] only that which has the purpose of its existence within itself—*man*. Man can himself determine his purposes by reason; or, where he has to take them from outer perception, he can still compare them with essential and universal purposes and then judge the former purposes' harmony with the latter ones aesthetically as well. It is *man*, alone among all objects in the world, who admits of an ideal of *beauty*, just as the humanity in his person, [i.e., in man considered] as an intelligence,<sup>52</sup> is the only [thing] in the world that admits of the ideal of *perfection*.

But this [ideal of beauty] has two components. The *first* is the aesthetic *standard idea*, which is an individual intuition (of the imagination) [by] which [we] present the standard for judging man as a thing belonging to a particular animal species. The *second* is the *rational idea*, which makes the purposes of humanity, insofar as they cannot be presented in sensibility, the principle for judging his figure, which reveals these purposes, as their effect in appearance.<sup>53</sup> The standard idea of the [figure or] shape of an animal of a particular kind has to take its elements from experience. But the greatest purposiveness in the structure of that shape resides merely in the judging person's idea; and it is this greatest purposiveness—the image on which nature's technic<sup>54</sup> was, as it were, intentionally based, and to which only the kind as a whole but no individual by itself is adequate—which would be suitable as the universal standard for judging each individual of that species aesthetically. And yet this idea and its proportions can be exhibited as an aesthetic idea fully *in concreto* in a model image. In order that we may grasp this [process] to some extent (for who can elicit nature's secret entirely?), let us attempt a psychological explanation.

<sup>52</sup>[i.e., as a free rational (and noumenal) being, rather than as a being of sense. Cf. the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 114, and the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 418.]

<sup>53</sup>[Cf. the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, Ak. IV, 343-47; the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 114-15; and the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. IV, 446-63.]

<sup>54</sup>[See above, Ak. 193 br. n. 35.]

Mem  
com-  
beauty

Notice how in a manner wholly beyond our grasp our imagination is able on occasion not only to recall, even from the distant past, the signs that stand for concepts, but also to reproduce [an] object's image and shape from a vast number of objects of different kinds or even of one and the same kind. Moreover, all indications suggest that this power, when the mind wants to make comparisons, can actually proceed as follows, though this process does not reach consciousness: the imagination projects, as it were, one image onto another, and from the congruence of most images of the same kind it arrives at an average that serves as the common standard for all of them. For instance: Someone has seen a thousand adult men. If now he wishes to make a judgment about their standard size, to be estimated by way of a comparison, then (in my opinion) the imagination projects a large number of the images (perhaps the entire thousand) onto one another. If I may be permitted to illustrate this by an analogy from optics: in the space where most of the images are united, and within the outline where the area is illuminated by the color applied most heavily, there the *average size* emerges, equally distant in both height and breadth from the outermost bounds of the tallest and shortest stature; and that is the stature for a beautiful man. (The same result could be obtained mechanically, by measuring the entire thousand, adding up separately all their heights and their breadths (and thicknesses) by themselves and then dividing each sum by a thousand. And yet the imagination does just that by means of a dynamic effect arising from its multiple apprehension of such shapes on the organ of the inner sense.<sup>55</sup>) Now if in a similar way we try to find for this average man the average head, for it the average nose, etc., then it is this shape which underlies the standard idea of a beautiful man in the country where this comparison is made. That is why, given these empirical conditions, a Negro's standard idea of the beauty of the [human] figure necessarily differs from that of a white man, that of a Chinese from that of a European. The same would apply to the model of a beautiful horse or dog (of a certain breed). This *standard idea* is not derived from proportions that are taken from experience as *determi-*

<sup>55</sup>[In the *Anthropology* (Ak. VII, 161), Kant suggests that one "might say" that the *soul* is the organ of the inner sense. But in the *Critique of Pure Reason* no such organ is mentioned, and the *soul* is repeatedly called the *object* of the inner sense. (E.g., at A 342 = B 400 and A 846 = B 874.)]

235

*nate rules*. Rather, it is in accordance with this idea that rules for judging become possible in the first place. It is the image for the entire kind, hovering between all the singular and multiply varied intuitions of the individuals, the image that nature used as the archetype on which it based its productions within any one species, but which it does not seem to have attained completely in any individual. The standard idea is by no means the entire *archetype of beauty* within this kind, but is only the form that constitutes the indispensable condition of all beauty, and hence merely the *correctness* in the exhibition of the kind. It is the *rule*, just as the famous *Doryphorus* of Polyclitus was called the rule (*Myron's* Cow, within its kind, also allowed this use, as such a rule).<sup>56</sup> It is precisely because of this, too, that the standard idea cannot contain any specific characteristics, since then it would not be the *standard idea* for that kind. Nor is it because of its beauty that we like its exhibition, but merely because it does not contradict any of the conditions under which alone a thing of this kind can be beautiful. The exhibition is merely academically correct.<sup>57</sup>

But from this *standard idea* of the beautiful we must still distinguish the *ideal* of the beautiful, which for reasons already stated must be expected solely in the *human figure*. Now the ideal in this figure consists in the expression of the *moral*; apart from the moral the object would not be liked universally and moreover positively (rather than merely negatively, when it is exhibited in a way that is [merely]

<sup>56</sup>[Polyclitus (the Elder) and Myron are both Greek sculptors of the fifth century B.C.; the *Doryphorus* (Spearbearer) and the Cow are works of theirs.]

<sup>57</sup>It will be found that a perfectly regular face, such as a painter would like to have as a model, usually conveys nothing. This is because it contains nothing characteristic and hence expresses more the idea of the [human] kind than what is specific in one person; if what is characteristic in this way is exaggerated, i.e., if it offends against the standard idea (of the purposiveness of the kind) itself, then it is called a *caricature*. Experience shows, moreover, that such wholly regular faces usually indicate that inwardly too the person is only mediocre.<sup>58</sup> I suppose (if we may assume that nature expresses in [our] outward [appearance] the proportions of what is inward) this is because, if none of the mental predispositions stands out beyond the proportion that is required for someone to constitute merely a person free from defects, then we must not expect in him any degree of what we call *genius*; in the case of *genius*<sup>59</sup> nature seems to depart from the proportions it usually imparts to our mental powers, instead favoring just one.

<sup>58</sup>[Cf. the *Anthropology*, Ak. VII, 298.]

<sup>59</sup>[Cf. § § 46-50, Ak. 307-20.]

academically correct). Now it is true that this visible expression of moral ideas that govern man inwardly can be taken only from experience. Yet these moral ideas must be connected, in the idea of the highest purposiveness, with everything that our reason links with the morally good: goodness of soul, or purity, or fortitude, or serenity, etc.; and in order for this connection to be made visible, as it were, in bodily expression (as an effect of what is inward), pure ideas of reason must be united with a very strong imagination in someone who seeks so much as to judge, let alone exhibit, it. The correctness of such an ideal of beauty is proved by its not permitting any charm of sense to be mingled with the liking for its object, while yet making us take a great interest in it. This in turn proves that a judging by such a standard can never be purely aesthetic, and that a judging by an ideal of beauty is not a mere judgment of taste.

236

## Explication of the Beautiful Inferred from the Third Moment

*Beauty* is an object's form of *purposiveness* insofar as it is perceived in the object *without the presentation of a purpose*.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>60</sup>It might be adduced as a counterinstance to this explication that there are things in which we see a purposive form without recognizing a purpose in them [but which we nevertheless do not consider beautiful]. Examples are the stone utensils sometimes excavated from ancient burial mounds, which are provided with a hole as if for a handle. Although these clearly betray in their shape a purposiveness whose purpose is unknown, we do not declare them beautiful on that account. And yet, the very fact that we regard them as work[s] of art already forces us to admit that we are referring their shape to some intention or other and to some determinate purpose. That is also why we have no direct liking whatever for their intuition. A flower, on the other hand, e.g., a tulip, is considered beautiful, because in our perception of it we encounter a certain purposiveness that, given how we are judging the flower, we do not refer to any purpose whatever.

## Fourth Moment of a Judgment of Taste, As to the Modality of the Liking for the Object

### § 18

## What the Modality of a Judgment of Taste Is

About any presentation I can say at least that there is a *possibility* for it (as a cognition) to be connected with a pleasure. About that which I call *agreeable* I say that it *actually* gives rise to pleasure in me. But we think of the *beautiful* as having a *necessary*<sup>61</sup> reference to liking. This necessity is of a special kind. It is not a theoretical objective necessity, allowing us to cognize a priori that everyone *will feel* this liking for the object I call beautiful. Nor is it a practical objective necessity, where, through concepts of a pure rational will that serves freely acting beings as a rule, this liking is the necessary consequence of an objective law and means nothing other than that one absolutely (without any further aim) ought to act in a certain way. Rather, as a necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be called *exemplary*, i.e., a necessity of the assent of *everyone* to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that we are unable to state. Since an aesthetic judgment is not an objective and cognitive one, this necessity cannot be derived from determinate concepts and hence is not apodeictic. Still less can it be inferred from the universality of experience (from a thorough agreement among judgments about the beauty of a certain object). For not only would experience hardly furnish a sufficient amount of evidence for this, but

<sup>61</sup>[Emphasis added. Cf., on modality, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 80 – B 106.]



a concept of the necessity of these judgments cannot be based on empirical judgments.

## § 19

### The Subjective Necessity That We Attribute to a Judgment of Taste Is Conditioned

A judgment of taste requires everyone to assent; and whoever declares something to be beautiful holds that everyone *ought* to give his approval to the object at hand and that he too should declare it beautiful. Hence the *ought* in an aesthetic judgment, even once we have [*nach*] all the data needed for judging, is still uttered only conditionally. We ~~solicit everyone else's assent~~ because we have a basis for it that is common to all. Indeed, we could count on that assent, if only we could always be sure that the instance had been subsumed correctly under that basis,<sup>62</sup> which is the rule for the approval.

<sup>62</sup>[Cf. Ak. 216 incl. br. n. 30.]

## § 20

### The Condition for the Necessity Alleged by a Judgment of Taste Is the Idea of a Common Sense

If judgments of taste had (as cognitive judgments do) a determinate objective principle, then anyone making them in accordance with that principle would claim that his judgment is unconditionally necessary. If they had no principle at all, like judgments of the mere taste of sense, then the thought that they have a necessity would not occur to us at all. So they must have a subjective principle, which determines only by feeling rather than by concepts, though nonetheless with universal validity, what is liked or disliked. Such a principle, however, could only be regarded as a *common sense*. This common sense is essentially distinct from the common understanding that is sometimes also called common sense (*sensus communis*); for the latter judges not by feeling but always by concepts, even though these concepts are usually only principles conceived obscurely.

Only under the presupposition, therefore, that there is a common sense (by which, however, we [also] do not mean an outer sense, but mean the effect arising from the free play of our cognitive powers)—only under the presupposition of such a common sense, I maintain, can judgments of taste be made.

## § 21

### Whether We Have a Basis for Presupposing a Common Sense

Cognitions and judgments, along with the conviction that accompanies them, must be universally communicable. For otherwise we could not

attribute to them a harmony with the object, but they would one and all be a merely subjective play of the presentational powers, just as skepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to be communicated, then the mental state, i.e., the attunement of the cognitive powers that is required for cognition in general—namely, that proportion [between them which is] suitable for turning a presentation (by which an object is given us) into cognition—must also be universally communicable. For this attunement is the subjective condition of [the process of] cognition, and without it cognition [in the sense of] the effect [of this process]<sup>63</sup> could not arise. And this [attunement] does actually take place whenever a given object, by means of the senses, induces the imagination to its activity of combining the manifold, the imagination in turn inducing the understanding to its activity of providing unity for this manifold in concepts. But this attunement of the cognitive powers varies in its proportion, depending on what difference there is among the objects that are given. And yet there must be one attunement in which this inner relation is most conducive to the (mutual) quickening of the two mental powers with a view to cognition (of given objects) in general; and the only way this attunement can be determined is by feeling (rather than by concepts). Moreover, this attunement itself, and hence also the feeling of it (when a presentation is given), must be universally communicable, while the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense. Hence it would seem that we do have a basis for assuming such a sense, and for assuming it without relying on psychological observations, but as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which must be presupposed in any logic and any principle of cognitions that is not skeptical.

<sup>63</sup>[Cf. Ak. 167 br. n. 2.]

## § 22

## The Necessity of the Universal Assent That We Think in a Judgment of Taste Is a Subjective Necessity That We Present as Objective by Presupposing a Common Sense

Whenever we make a judgment declaring something to be beautiful, we permit no one to hold a different opinion, even though we base our judgment only on our feeling rather than on concepts; hence we regard this underlying feeling as a common rather than as a private feeling. But if we are to use this common sense in such a way, we cannot base it on experience; for it seeks to justify us in making judgments that contain an ought: it does not say that everyone will agree with my judgment, but that he *ought* to. Hence the common sense, of whose judgment I am at that point offering my judgment of taste as an example, attributing to it *exemplary* validity on that account, is a mere ideal standard. With this standard presupposed, we could rightly turn a judgment that agreed with it, as well as the liking that is expressed in it for some object, into a rule for everyone. For although the principle is only subjective, it would still be assumed as subjectively universal (an idea necessary for everyone); and so it could, like an objective principle, demand universal assent insofar as agreement among different judging persons is concerned, provided only we were certain that we had subsumed under it correctly.

That we do actually presuppose this indeterminate standard of a common sense is proved by the fact that we presume to make judgments of taste. But is there in fact such a common sense, as a

constitutive principle of the possibility of experience, or is there a still higher principle of reason that makes it only a regulative principle for us, [in order] to bring forth in us, for higher purposes, a common sense in the first place? In other words, is taste an original and natural ability, or is taste only the idea of an ability yet to be acquired and [therefore] artificial, so that a judgment of taste with its requirement for universal assent is in fact only a demand of reason to produce such agreement in the way we sense? In the latter case the *ought*,<sup>64</sup> i.e., the objective necessity that everyone's feeling flow along with the particular feeling of each person, would signify only that there is a possibility of reaching such agreement; and the judgment of taste would only offer an example of the application of this principle. These questions we neither wish to nor can investigate at this point. For the present our task is only to analyze the power of taste into its elements, and to unite these ultimately in the idea of a common sense.

## Explication of the Beautiful Inferred from the Fourth Moment

*Beautiful* is what without a concept is cognized as the object of a necessary liking.

<sup>64</sup>[Emphasis added.]

## General Comment on the First Division<sup>65</sup> of the Analytic

If we take stock of the above analyses, we find that everything comes down to the concept of taste, namely, that taste is an ability to judge an object in reference to the *free lawfulness* of the imagination. Therefore, in a judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its freedom. This implies, first of all, that this power is here not taken as reproductive, where it is subject to the laws of association, but as productive and spontaneous (as the originator of chosen forms of possible intuitions).<sup>66</sup> Moreover, [second,] although in apprehending a given object of sense the imagination is tied to a determinate form of this object and to that extent does not have free play (as it does [e.g.] in poetry), it is still conceivable that the object may offer it just the sort of form in the combination of its manifold as the imagination, if it were left to itself [and] free, would design in harmony with the *understanding's lawfulness* in general. And yet, to say that the *imagination* is *free* and yet *lawful of itself*, i.e., that it carries autonomy with it, is a contradiction. The understanding alone gives the law. But when the imagination is compelled to proceed according to a determinate law, then its product is determined by concepts (as far as its form is concerned);<sup>67</sup> but in that case the liking, as was shown above,<sup>68</sup> is a liking not for the beautiful but for the good (of perfection, at any rate, formal perfection), and the judgment is not a judgment

<sup>65</sup>[The first *Book*, actually.]

<sup>66</sup>[Cf. the *Anthropology*, Ak. VII, 167: "The imagination (*facultas imaginandi*), as a power to intuit even when the object is not present, is either *productive* or *reproductive*. As productive, it is a power of original exhibition of the object (*exhibitio originaria*), and hence of an exhibition that precedes experience. As reproductive, it is a power of derivative exhibition (*exhibitio derivativa*), an exhibition that brings back to the mind an empirical intuition we have had before." See also the *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 151-52.]

<sup>67</sup>[Parentheses added.]

<sup>68</sup>[See esp. §§ 15 and 16, Ak. 226-31.]

made by taste. It seems, therefore, that only a lawfulness without a law, and a subjective harmony of the imagination with the understanding without an objective harmony—where the presentation is referred to a determinate concept of an object—is compatible with the free lawfulness of the understanding (which has also been called purposiveness without a purpose<sup>69</sup>) and with the peculiarity of a judgment of taste.

It is true that critics of taste commonly adduce geometrically regular figures, such as a circle, square, or cube, etc., as the simplest and most indubitable examples of beauty. And yet these are called regular precisely because the only way we can present them is by regarding them as mere exhibitions of a determinate concept that prescribes the rule for that figure (the rule under which alone the figure is possible). Hence one of these two must be erroneous: either that judgment by the critics which attributes beauty to such figures, or our judgment that beauty requires a purposiveness without a concept.

Probably no one would hold that a man of taste is required in order to like a circular figure better than a scrawled outline, an equilateral and equiangular quadrangle better than one that is scalene and lopsided, as it were, misshapen; for no taste at all is required for this, but only common understanding. When we pursue an aim, such as to judge the size of an area or, in a division, to enable ourselves to grasp the relation of the parts to one another and to the whole, we require regular figures, and those of the simplest kind; and here our liking does not rest directly on how the figure looks, but rests on its usefulness for all sorts of possible aims. A room whose walls form oblique angles, a garden plot of that kind, even any violation of symmetry in the figure of animals (such as being one-eyed) or of buildings or flower beds: all of these we dislike because they are contrapurposeful, not only practically with regard to some definite use of them, but contrapurposeful also for our [very] judging of them with all sorts of possible aims [in mind]. This is not the case in a judgment of taste; when such a judgment is pure, it connects liking or disliking directly with the mere contemplation of the object,<sup>70</sup> irrespective of its use or any purpose. It is true that the regularity leading to the concept of an object is

<sup>69</sup>[See Ak. 226 and 236.]

<sup>70</sup>[Cf. Ak. 209 and 222.]

the indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*) for apprehending [fassen] the object in a single presentation and determining the manifold in the object's form; [and] this determination is a purpose [we pursue] with regard to cognition, and as so related to cognition it is indeed always connected with a liking (since achieving any aim [Absicht], even a problematic one, is accompanied by a liking). But here the liking is merely our approval of the solution satisfying a problem, and not a free and indeterminately purposive entertainment [Unterhaltung] of the mental powers regarding what we call beautiful, where the understanding serves the imagination rather than vice versa.

In a thing that is possible only through an intention [Absicht], such as a building or even an animal, that regularity which consists in the thing's symmetry must express the unity of the intuition that accompanies the concept of the [thing's] purpose, and is part of the cognition. But where only a free play of our presentational powers is to be sustained [unterhalten] (though under the condition that the understanding suffers no offense), as in the case of pleasure gardens, room decoration, all sorts of tasteful utensils, and so on, any regularity that has an air of constraint<sup>71</sup> is [to be] avoided as much as possible. That is why the English taste in gardens, or the baroque taste in furniture, carries the imagination's freedom very far, even to the verge of the grotesque, because it is precisely in this divorce from any constraint of a rule that the case is posed where taste can show its greatest perfection in designs made by the imagination.

Everything that [shows] stiff regularity (close to mathematical regularity) runs counter to taste because it does not allow us to be entertained for long by our contemplation of it; instead it bores us, unless it is expressly intended either for cognition or for a determinate practical purpose. On the other hand, whatever lends itself to unstudied and purposive play by the imagination is always new to us and we never tire of looking at it. Marsden,<sup>72</sup> in his description of

<sup>71</sup>[Cf. Ak. 306.]

<sup>72</sup>William Marsden (1754-1836), English philologist and ethnologist. He spent a number of years in Sumatra and is the author of a *History of Sumatra* (1783) as well as a *Grammar and Dictionary of the Malay Language* (1812). He also translated the *Travels of Marco Polo* (1818).]

Sumatra, comments that the free beauties of nature there surround the beholder everywhere, so that there is little left in them to attract him; whereas, when in the midst of a forest he came upon a pepper garden, with the stakes that supported the climbing plants forming paths between them along parallel lines, it charmed him greatly. He concludes from this that we like wild and apparently ruleless beauty only as a change, when we have been satiated with the sight of regular beauty. And yet he need only have made the experiment of spending one day with his pepper garden to realize that, once regularity has [prompted] the understanding to put itself into attainment with order which it requires everywhere, the object ceases to entertain him and instead inflicts on his imagination an irksome constraint; whereas nature in those regions, extravagant in all its diversity to the point of opulence, subject to no constraint from artificial rules, can nourish his taste permanently. Even bird song, which we cannot bring under any rule of music, seems to contain more freedom and hence to offer more to taste than human song, even when this human song is performed according to all the rules of the art of music, because we tire much sooner of a human song if it is repeated often and for long periods. And yet in this case we probably confuse our participation in the cheerfulness of a favorite little animal with the beauty of its song, for when bird song is imitated very precisely by a human being (as is sometimes done with the nightingale's warble) it strikes our ear as quite tasteless.

Again, we must distinguish beautiful objects from beautiful views of objects (where their distance prevents us from recognizing them distinctly). In beautiful views of objects, taste seems to fasten not so much on what the imagination *apprehends* in that area, as on the occasion they provide for it to engage in *fiction* [*dichten*], i.e., on the actual fantasies with which the mind entertains itself as it is continually being aroused by the diversity that strikes the eye.<sup>73</sup> This is

<sup>73</sup>[Cf. the *Anthropology*, Ak. VII, 167-68: "The imagination, insofar as it produces imaginings involuntarily as well, is called *fantasy*. . . [So] (in other words) the imagination either engages in *fiction* (i.e., it is productive), or in *recall* (i.e., it is reproductive). But this does not mean that the productive imagination is *creative*, i.e., capable of producing a presentation of sense that was *never* before given to our power of sense; rather, we can always show [from where the imagination took] its material." Cf. also, in the same work, §§ 31-33, Ak. VII, 174-82.]

similar to what happens when we watch, say, the changing shapes of the flames in a fireplace or of a rippling brook: neither of these are beauties, but they still charm the imagination because they sustain its free play.