

Trickster Discourse

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## TRICKSTER DISCOURSE

Gerald Vizenor

**N**ATIVE AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORIES and literatures, oral and written, are imagined from “wisps of narratives.” These narrative wisps, wrote Jean-François Lyotard, are “stories that one tells, that one hears, that one acts out; the people does not exist as a subject but as a mass of millions of insignificant and serious little stories that sometimes let themselves be collected together to constitute big stories and sometimes disperse into digressive elements.”<sup>1</sup> The tribal trickster, as a comic *holotrope*, deconstructs even narrative wisps in the elements of culture.

The critical attention in this collection is postmodernism: new essays on narrative discourse, authors, readers, tricksters, and comic world views, rather than tragic themes and modernism.

Lyotard uses the word *postmodern* to describe “the condition of knowledge in the most highly developed societies” and to designate “the state of our culture following the transformations which, since the end of the nineteenth century, have altered the game rules for science, literature, and the arts.” His studies “place these transformations in the context of the crisis of narratives.”<sup>2</sup>

The word *postmodernism* is a clever condition, a narrative wisp in a new language game, and an overture to amend the formal interpretations and transubstantiation of tribal literatures.

Ihab Hassan, for instance, wrote that postmodernism sounds awkward and uncouth. The word “evokes what it wishes to surpass or suppress, modernism itself. The term thus contains its enemy within, as the terms romanticism and classicism, baroque and rococo, do not. . . . But if much of modernism appears hieratic, hypotactical, and formalist, postmodernism strikes us by contrast as playful, paratactical, and deconstructionist.”<sup>3</sup>

Brian McHale, on the other hand, asserts, “Nobody likes the term, yet people continue to prefer it over the even less satisfactory alternatives. . . . Postmodernism is not post modern, whatever that might mean, but post *modernism*; it does not come *after the present* (a solecism), but after the *modernist movement*. . . . Postmodernism follows *from* modernism.” He wrote that a “superior construction of postmodernism would be one that produces new insights, new or richer connections, coherence of a different degree or kind, ultimately *more discourse*.”<sup>4</sup>

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Native American Indian literatures are tribal discourse, more discourse. The oral and written narratives are language games; comic discourse rather than mere responses to colonialist demands or social science theories.

Stephen Tyler, in his essay on postmodern anthropology, considers discourse as the “maker of the world, not its mirror. . . . The world is what we say it is, and what we speak of is the world.” Tribal narratives are discourse, and in this sense, tribal literatures are the world rather than a representation. Tyler argues that one of the constant themes in the dominant culture has been the “search for apodictic and universal method. In our own times we see the triumph of formalism in all branches of thought. . . . Form, in other words, produces form; it is both process and structure. . . . He points out that postmodern “writing focuses on the outer flow of speech, seeking not the thought that ‘underlies’ speech, but the thought that *is* speech. . . . Modernists sought a form of writing more in keeping with ‘things,’ emphasizing, in imitation of modern science, the descriptive function of writing — writing as a ‘picture of reality.’” Postmodern writing overturns “modernist *mimesis* in favor of a writing that ‘evokes’ or ‘calls to mind,’ not by completion and similarity but by suggestion and difference. The function of the text is not to depict or reveal within itself what it says. The text is ‘seen through’ by what it cannot say. It shows what it cannot say and says what it cannot show.”<sup>5</sup>

### Pleasurable Misreadings

The world is a text, Vincent Leitch argues in *Deconstructive Criticism*, and nothing stands behind this world of tropes because a literal language does not exist, except in illusions. The literal translations and representations of tribal literatures are illusions, consolations in the dominant culture. There can never be “correct” or “objective” readings of the text, or the tropes in tribal literatures, only more energetic, interesting and “pleasurable misreadings.”<sup>6</sup>

Native American Indian literatures have been pressed into cultural categories, transmuted by reductionism, animadversions, and the hyper-realities of neocolonial consumerism. The concept of “hyperrealities” is borrowed from *Travels in Hyperreality* by Umberto Eco. He wrote that Americans live in a “more to come” consumer culture. “This is the reason for this journey into hyperreality, in search of instances where the American imagination demands the real thing and, to attain it, must fabricate the absolute fake; where the boundaries between game and illusion are blurred. . . .”<sup>7</sup> Tribal cultures, in this sense, have been invented as “absolute fakes” and consumed in social science monologues. The consumers demand more cultures and new literatures; at the

same time, postmodern criticism would liberate tribal narratives in a most "pleasurable misreading."

Native American Indian literatures are unstudied landscapes, wild and comic rather than tragic and representational, storied with narrative wisps and tribal discourse. Social science theories constrain tribal landscapes to institutional values, representationalism, and the politics of academic determination. The narrow teleologies deduced from social science monologues, and the ideologies that arise from structuralism, have reduced tribal literatures to an "objective" collection of consumable cultural artifacts. Postmodernism liberates imagination and widens the audiences for tribal literatures; this new criticism rouses a comic world view, narrative discourse, and language games on the past.

"The return to the past, to the traces, fragments, and debris of memory and history is both necessary and inconclusive," reasoned David Carroll. "The acceptance of representation in its simple sense is a kind of bureaucratic solution to the conflicts of history, an acquiescence to the demands and false security of realism without the will or the force to maintain the potentially irresolvable contradiction of the struggle."<sup>8</sup> Monologic realism and representation in tribal literatures, in this sense, is a "bureaucratic solution" to neocolonialism and the consumption of narratives and cultures.

David Carroll, in a recent essay on narrative and politics, wrote, "Any narrative that predetermines all responses or prohibits any counter-narratives puts an end to narrative itself by suppressing all possible alternative actions and responses, by making itself its own end and the end of all other narratives."<sup>9</sup>

### **Narrative Dissidence**

Antonin Dvořák, the composer, and Oleg Cassini, the modern couturier, have in common their unusual interests in tribal cultures; now a source of "little dissident narratives" and ironic literature.<sup>10</sup> Separated in time by a century, these two men shared certain hyperrealities about Native American Indian cultures.

"The Americans expect great things of me," wrote Dvořák. "And the main thing is . . . to create a national music. Now, if the small Czech nation can have such musicians, they say, why could not they, too, when their country and people are so immense?"<sup>11</sup>

Patricia Hampl, in her sensitive meditation on the Czech composer, wrote that he arrived in Spillville, Iowa, in 1893, with his wife, six children, housemaid, and secretary. "They stayed the whole summer, an unusually hot one, past Dvořák's fifty-second birthday, which fell on the feast of the Nativity of Mary, September 8. He passed out cigars to the

townspeople who gathered for a celebration in his honor. Two days later — quite suddenly it seemed to some people — he and his family packed up and were gone, back the long way they had come.”<sup>12</sup>

Big Moon, the Kickapoo leader and healer, was in Spillville late that summer with other tribal people to sell medicinal herbs. Dvořák attended the tribal dances, listened to the music, and even paid for a snake oil headache treatment; he consumed the hyperrealities that he believed were tribal, authentic, real and representational. He was inspired, a franchised composer at the turn of the last century, and imagined a national music; meanwhile, most tribal cultures were enslaved on reservations. The tribal people he encountered were on the boundaries; modern immigrants surrounded by “native immigrants” that summer in a small town. Their stories are narrative wisps in the national tenure on savagism and civilization.

“He believed the answer lay in the music of the slaves,” Hampl wrote, “Negro spirituals, and in American Indian music, especially its insistent, patient rhythms. . . . Maybe he could not perceive the American hesitation. In the old country ‘the peasants’ were himself, his family. His people. In America there was a boundary. Black and white, red and white. We call it racism. He stepped over the line easily, perhaps thinking Indian drum beats were as accessible to white American composers as Czech folk music was to him. He didn’t hear the heavier hit of the drum on the ear, the black wail it is impossible to borrow.”<sup>13</sup>

Dvořák considered an opera based on *The Song of Hiawatha* by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, a romantic colonialist poem. “He had read the poem in translation,” Hampl wrote. “Naturally, its admiration for the indigenous culture appealed to Dvořák. So did Longfellow’s lyrical, if rather didactic, restatement of landscape and the beauties of nature,” but the idea “fizzled.”<sup>14</sup>

Dvořák and his daughter Otilka, who was fifteen that summer, visited the Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition; behind the mechanical Uncle Sam on the Midway, the barkers and pitch men, Otilka must have witnessed the ethnic exhibits, tribal dances, and ceremonies. In 1893 the exhibits included a Bedouin camp, a Winnebago Indian village, a Lapland village, a Persian palace, a Chinese market, and other cultural hyperrealities.<sup>15</sup>

Otilka returned to Spillville. Later that summer she was seen near the tribal camp on the boundaries, near the river where her father walked and recorded the sounds of water, birds, and tribal music. She was seen “roaming around the woods, Big Moon by her side. Keeping company. . . . It was Big Moon with her in the woods by the Turkey River, and what of it?”<sup>16</sup> Dvořák was told about his daughter and the tribal leader who had danced for the composer and treated his headache. “Like

so much, it depends on your attitude, your place in the story," wrote Hampl. "That night the Dvoráks started packing. They were gone the next day."<sup>17</sup>

Dvorák pursued the hyperrealities of tribal cultures, the structured ceremonies at the tenable borders of civilization in a small town, imagined tribal music as an instance of nationalism, and worried about his daughter too close to savagism. This, the wilderness in flesh and blood too close to home, is where hyperrealities and dioramas transmute the landscape and narrative discourse.

"I see the rest," wrote Hampl. "Girl on a pony, gold light in the blue morning sky, a glade where a good-looking man, native to the place, puts his hand surely between two clumps of fern to expose for her the white wood mallow, a plant she had never seen before."<sup>18</sup>

Oleg Cassini, the personal couturier and costume designer, considered "looks and styles" and historical periods in his fashion career; unabashed hyperrealities abound in his recent autobiography. "I realized that there was one area I'd never really exploited: my lifelong obsession with American Indians."<sup>19</sup> Cassini satisfied his obsession in an agreement with Peter MacDonald, the elected chairman of the Navajo Nation. Cassini announced at the National Press Club in Washington that he would build, as a joint venture with the tribal government, a "world-class luxury resort" on the reservation. The architecture and furnishings of the tourist resort would "have their base in authentic Navajo designs." MacDonald said the designer resort would "reflect the unique culture and tradition of our people." Moreover, the tribal leader announced, "We are creating a Navajo Board of Standards for all new tourist facilities on the Reservation to assure that the Navajo name means quality."<sup>20</sup> Designer hyperrealities are valuable properties in a consumer culture, even on reservations.

Cassini stated in one instance his clever attention to cultural selection and tribal standards. "A good many of my American Indian dresses required intricate beading of a sort that was not available in Italy," he wrote in his autobiography. "I'd been told Hong Kong was the place to find such material. . . . And then the show began. The line was modeled by girls with dark hair and the somatic characteristics of Indians; one wore beads and headdresses. Sometimes the models were barefoot, but generally they wore moccasins."<sup>21</sup>

These stories are serious and comic, the numerous narrative wisps that controvert hyperrealities. Tribal literatures are burdened with colonialism and tragic world views; however, there is a curious humanism in tribal narratives on minacious consumerism. Serious attention to cultural hyperrealities is an invitation to trickster discourse, an imaginative liberation in comic narratives; the trickster is postmodern.

Mikhail Bakhtin considered consciousness and character identification in aesthetic events; in trickster discourse the trickster is a comic trope, a chance separation in a narrative. "There are events that, in principle, cannot unfold on the plane of a single and unified consciousness, but presuppose two consciousnesses that do not fuse; they are events whose essential and constitutive elements is the relation of a consciousness to *another* consciousness, precisely because it is *other*. Such are all events that are creatively productive, innovative, unique, and irreversible."<sup>22</sup> Tribal narratives are creative productions rather than social science monologues; the trickster is a comic trope, chance in a narrative wisp, tribal discourse, and an irreversible innovation in literature.

### Comic Signs and Holotropes

The trickster is a communal sign in a comic narrative; the comic *holotrope* (the whole figuration) is a consonance in tribal discourse. Silence and separation, not monologues in social science methodologies, are the antitheses of trickster discourse. The instrumental language of the social sciences are tragic, or *hypotragic*, modes that withhold communal discourse. Comic signs and tragic modes are cultural variations, the mood and humor in a language game; but not structural opposition.

Comic world views are communal; chance is more significant than "moral ruin." Tragic modes are inventions and impositions that attend the "discoverers" and translators of tribal narratives. The notion of the "vanishing tribes" is a lonesome nuisance, to cite one *hypotragic* intrusion, that reveals racialism and the contradictions in humanism and historical determinism. More than a century ago, when politicians, missionaries, and some intellectuals, argued over monogenesis and the "separate creation of nonwhite races," the commissioner of Indian affairs "asserted that 'the fact stands out clear, well-defined, and indisputable, that Indians, not only as individuals but as tribes, are capable of civilization and christianization.'"<sup>23</sup>

These two capabilities, however, were not acceptable to most whites at the time; those who "saw cultures with primitive technologies, engaged in some limited agriculture yet dependent to a large extent upon hunting and gathering for food and apparel." It was common then "to refer to Indian communities as hunter societies as opposed to white societies engaged in agriculture and domestic industries. . . . They contrasted the preliterate Indian societies . . . with the accomplishments of their own society and judged the Indian languages generally worthless even though of scientific interest . . . and they saw their own rapidly

multiplying population overwhelming the static or declining numbers of the Indian tribes."<sup>24</sup>

The paternal rhetoric of liberal politics, however, promised that peace, wealth, and power, would be shared; but there was no salvation in the domination, revision, or transvaluation of tribal cultures. In the *hypotragic* end there are tricksters and comedies — chance, humor, and at best, a communal discourse in a tribal narrative. The colonists strained to tame the wild, the tribes and the environment; now, high technologies overbear postcolonial promises and transvaluations, the tragic mode is in ruin.

Comic signs in tribal narratives, and then tragic modes in translations and imposed histories, are seldom mentioned in social science research and “discoveries.” To understand these variations, and the problems of interpretation, we must turn to the theories of imaginative literature. Literary criticism, however, has not considered tribal narratives until the past two decades. Arnold Krupat comments that “there has been a sufficient amount of sophisticated writing about Native American literature in the last ten years or so to constitute a New Indian Criticism.”<sup>25</sup>

Even now, serious critical attention to tribal narratives is minimal and of a dubious virtue, given the instrumental possession of tribal experience by romantic adventurers, missionaries, and social scientists. “Prior to the twentieth century,” Michael Castro points out with no hesitation, “literary approaches to the Indian were dominated by two opposing and distancing stereotypes, the ‘brutish savage’ and the ‘noble savage,’ each serving underlying psychic needs of Western culture.”<sup>26</sup> These stereotypes, and several others, such as idiotism and “genetic code” alcoholism, are *hypotragic* impositions that denied a comic world view — the racist denial of tribal languages and ceremonies.

Histories read the past; or the past in the historical present, criticism reads the narrative, and the trickster reads neither; here, in trickster discourse, the trickster unties the *hypotragedies* imposed on tribal narratives — tribal narratives have been underread in criticism and overread in social science. The tragic mode is not in structural opposition to the comic sign, but a racial burden, a postcolonial overcompensation at best; these burdens are a dubious triumph. “Without a sense of the tragic, comedy loses heart, it becomes brittle, it has animation but no life,” asserts Richard Sewall. “Without a recognition of the truths of comedy, tragedy becomes bleak and intolerable.”<sup>27</sup> Social science theories, without a doubt, are “bleak” reminders of the *hypotragic* intrusion and postcolonial domination of tribal cultures and literature.



Aldous Huxley, more than fifty years ago, “wondered whether tragedy as a form of art, might not be doomed.” He witnessed colonial durance, the intrusions of “moral ruin” and the duress of romantic and tragic modes in the translation of comic tribal literature, but his concern centered on the classics; meanwhile, social science studies reproduced new theories and contributed not so much to the doom of tragedies, but to a new insolence in tribal literature, an outbreak of *hypotragies*. Huxley argues in “Tragedy and the Whole Truth” that tragedies are more than “mere verisimilitude” and empirical evidence, more than facts; tragedies are not the “whole truth.”<sup>28</sup> The trickster, a semiotic sign in a third person narrative, is never tragic, or *hypotragic*, never the whole truth, or even part truth; social science, on the other hand, is never comic, never a chance, and never tragic in the end — causal research strains to discover the “whole truth” or the invented truth in theories and models. These “whole truth” models imposed on tribal experiences are *hypotragies*, abnormal tragedies in this instance, with no comic imagination, no artistic intent, or the communal signification of mythic verism.

“To make a tragedy,” Huxley writes, “the artist must isolate a single element out of the totality of human experience and use that exclusively as his material. Tragedy is something that is separated out from the Whole Truth. . . .” George Steiner, in *The Death of Tragedy*, holds that tragedy is dead because of the promise of salvation, which is an argument similar to the “whole truth.”

Walter Kerr, in his classical studies on tragedy and comedy, points out that “tragedy is the form that promises us a happy ending.”<sup>29</sup> He argues that “comedy depends upon tragedy,” and that there is hope in tragedies, while in comedies “there is no way out.” He would not, it seems, agree with the notion of the “whole truth.” Kerr writes, “In short, tragedy should report every conceivable experience man can have as he exercises his freedom totally in the hope of arriving at a new state of being.”<sup>30</sup> Huxley declares, “For the fact is that tragedy and what I have called the Whole Truth are not compatible; where one is, the other is not.”

Social science theories isolate certain “elements” in tribal narratives; the construction of human experience is modular. The trickster is a communal sign, never isolation; a concordance of narrative voices. The trickster is not tragic because the narrative does not promise a “happy ending.” The comic and tragic, the *hypotragic*, are cultural variations; the trickster is opposed by silence and isolation, not social science. The antithesis of the tragic in social science is chaos, rumors, and wild conversations. The trickster livens chaos, but, as Paul Watzlawick has argued, realities in social science rest “on the supposition that the world cannot be chaotic — not because we have any proof for this view, but

because chaos would simply be intolerable." The comic trickster and social science, a tragic monologue, are contradictions, but not antithetical; social science is a limited language game.<sup>31</sup>

"The comic rites are necessarily impious," muses Wylie Sypher, "for comedy is sacrilege as well as release. . . . We find ourselves reflected in the comedian, who satisfies our need for impieties."<sup>32</sup> Sypher maintains that the "high comic vision of life is humane, an achievement of man as a social being," which would include trickster narratives, comic *holotropes*, and concordance in discourse. "So the comic spirit keeps us pure in mind by requiring that we regard ourselves skeptically. Indeed this spirit is an agent of that civilizing activity Matthew Arnold called 'criticism,' which is essential to 'culture.'"<sup>33</sup>

The trickster, then, is a sign, a comic and communal sign, and a discourse in a narrative with no hope or tragic promises. The trickster is neither the "whole truth" nor an isolated *hypotragic* transvaluation of primitivism. The trickster is as aggressive as those who imagine the narrative, but the trickster bears no evil or malice in narrative voices. Malice and evil would silence the comic *holotropes*; there would be no concordance in the discourse, the narrator, characters, and the audience, would not share the narrative event.

Arthur Koestler observes in "The Act of Creation" that there are various "moods involved in different forms of humor, including mixed or contradictory feelings; but what ever the mixture, it must contain a basic ingredient which is indispensable: an impulse, however faint, of aggression or apprehension. . . ." <sup>34</sup> He writes, "Replace aggression by sympathy," as liberal humanists and postcolonial interpreters have done with tribal cultures, "and the same situation will no longer be comic but pathetic, and evoke not laughter but pity."

Freedom is a sign, and the trickster is chance and freedom in a comic sign; comic freedom is a "doing," not an essence, not a museum being, or an aesthetic presence. The trickster, as a semiotic sign, is imagined in narrative voices, a communal rein to the unconscious, which is comic liberation; however, the trickster is outside comic structure, "making it" comic rather than "inside comedy, being it."<sup>35</sup> The trickster is agonistic imagination and aggressive liberation, a "doing" in narrative points of view, and outside the imposed structures.

Jean-Paul Sartre reasoned that freedom, or comic liberation in this instance, is involvement, to be *engage* [engager] in a free choice; "a freedom which would produce its own existence would lose its very meaning. . . ." Freedom determines "itself by its very upsurge as a 'doing'"<sup>36</sup> The trickster is a comic sign with no histories, no political, or economic signification, and no being, or presence in the narrative. The trickster is "nothingness" in a narrative voice, an "encounter" that

centers imagination in comic *holotropes*, a communal being; "nothingness" in consciousness and comic discourse.

"Creativity occurs in an act of encounter," wrote Rollo May in *The Courage to Create*, "and is to be understood with this encounter as its center."<sup>37</sup> The trickster is an encounter in narrative voices, a communal sign and creative encounter in a discourse.

Tribal cultures, social science, and the environment have at least three circumstances in common: science is a trope to power and rules memories; science measures humans and the earth in *hypotragic* isolation and monologues; the tribes and the wilderness vanish in tragic narratives. The wild environment and tricksters are comic and communal; science is a monologue with science, not the environment, and the antitheses are silence and chaos. "In literature or in ecology, comedy enlightens and enriches human experience without trying to transform either mankind or the world," wrote Joseph Meeker in *The Comedy of Survival: Studies in Literary Ecology*. "The comic mode of human behavior represented in literature is the closest art has come to describing man as an adaptive animal."<sup>38</sup> The trickster animates this human adaptation in a comic language game, and social science overcomes chaos in a monologue; the environment bears the comedies and tragedies.

### Notes

1 Lyotard, Jean-François, *Instructions painnes* quoted by David Carroll, "Narrative, Heterogeneity, and the Question of the Political: Bakhtin and Lyotard," in *The Aims of Representation*, edited by Murray Krieger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 85.

2. Lyotard, Jean-François, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. xxiii.

3. Hassan, Ihab, *The Postmodern Turn* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987), pp. 87, 91.

4. McHale, Brian, *Postmodern Fiction* (New York: Methuen, 1987), p. 3-5.

5. Tyler, Stephen, "Post-Modern Anthropology" in *Discourse and the Social Life of Meaning*, edited by Phyllis Pease Chock and June Wyman (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), p. 37, 40, 45.

6. Leitch, Vincent, *Deconstructive Criticism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 59.

7. Eco, Umberto, *Travels in Hyperreality* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 8.

8. Carroll, David, *The Subject in Question* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 117.

9. Carroll, "Narrative, Heterogeneity, and the Question of the Political: Bakhtin and Lyotard," p. 77.

10. Carroll, "Narrative, Heterogeneity, and the Question of the Political: Bakhtin and Lyotard," p. 75. He wrote, "Hundreds, thousands of little dissident narratives of all sorts are produced in spite of all attempts to repress them, and they circulate inside and eventually, or even initially, outside the boundaries of the totalitarian state. The impor-

tance of these little narratives is not only that they challenge the dominant metanarrative and the state apparatus that would prohibit or discredit the, but that they also indicate the possibility of another kind of society, or another form of social relations. . . .”

11. Hampl, Patricia, *Spillville* (Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions, 1987), p. 82.
12. Hampl, p. 9.
13. Hampl, p. 9.
14. Hampl, p. 90.
15. Benedict, Burton, editor, *The Anthropology of World's Fairs* (London: Scolar Press; Berkeley: The Lowie Museum of Anthropology, 1983), p. 58.
16. Hampl, p. 92.
17. Hampl, p. 94.
18. Hampl, p. 98-99.
19. Cassini, Oleg, *In My Own Fashion: An Autobiography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 359.
20. *New York Times*, “Navajos Plan Luxury Resort for Tourists on Reservation,” by Wayne King, October 28, 1987.
21. Cassini, p. 360, 361, 362.
22. Bakhtin, Mikhail, in *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* by Tzvetan Todorov (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 99-100.
23. Prucha, Francis Paul, *The Indians in American Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 7
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.
25. Krupat, Arnold, *For Those Who Come After: A Study of Native American Autobiography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 4.
26. Castro, Michael, *Interpreting the Indian: Twentieth-Century Poets and the Native American* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983), p. xiv.
27. Sewall, Richard, *The Vision of Tragedy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 1.
28. Huxley, Aldous, “Tragedy and the Whole Truth,” *Virginia Quarterly Review*, April 1931, pp. 177-182.
29. Kerr, Walter, *Tragedy and Comedy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968), p. 36.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
31. Watzlawick, Paul, editor, *The Invented Reality* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), p. 63. John Berger provides an unusual distinction between opposition and separation. In *And Our Faces, My Heart Brief As Photos* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, page 89) he wrote, “The Opposite of to love is not to hate but to separate. If love and hate have something in common it is because, in both cases, their energy is that of bringing and holding together — the lover with the loved, the one who hates with the hated. Both passions are tested by separation.”
32. Sypher, Wylie, “The Meaning of Comedy” in *Comedy*, edited by Wylie Sypher (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), pp. 223-224.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 252-253.
34. Koestler, Arthur, “The Act of Creation” in *Bricks to Babel* (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 330.
35. Kerr, p. 15.
36. Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Being and Nothingness* (Secaucus, New Jersey: The Citadel Press, 1956), p. 461.
37. May, Rollo, *The Courage to Create* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), p. 77.
38. Meeker, Joseph, *The Comedy of Survival: Studies in Literary Ecology* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), pp. 39, 192.